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Abstract
This Comment examines how a mediator’s nationality can influence the mediating parties’
and communities’ perceptions of his neutrality and how cultural differences play a role in the ethi-
cal expectations of a cross-cultural mediator. Part I discusses the role of neutrality in cross-cultural
mediation and how neutrality is required and interpreted by codified ethical standards for medi-
ators in the United States and in several international organizations. Part II discusses the role of
culture in mediation, how culture influences ethical expectations, and the case studies of George
Mitchell, a mediator in Ireland and Israel-Palestine, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a mediator in Syria.
Mitchell and Brahimi are examples of mediators who worked with cultures that had different eth-
ical expectations of the mediator’s role than they were accustomed to in their respective cultures.
They both resigned in frustration and experienced great difficulty and public ridicule during their
terms. Part III analyzes Mitchell and Brahimi’s trials and failures in their mediations, and provides
suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural mediations. Through this analysis this Com-
ment clarifies the role of neutrality in mediation and how a mediator’s nationality influences how
mediating parties and their communities perceive his neutrality.
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INTRODUCTION 
To date, over 200,000 people have died in the Syrian conflict, 
with about half of the population displaced in the largest forced 
population migration since World War II.1 Although such 
circumstances deserve immediate resolution, Special Envoy Lakhdar 
Brahimi, with the participation of the United States and Russia, could 
not manage to facilitate a resolution to this conflict between the 
Syrian government and opposition, and resigned in frustration in 
                                                            
1. The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: Four Years Later and No End in Sight: Testimony 
Before the H. Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on the Middle East and North Africa and the 
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and Int'l Orgs, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Kelly T. Clements), http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/FA/FA13/20150212/102953/HHRG-114-FA13-Wstate-ClementsK-20150212.pdf 
(“Not since World War II raged across three continents has violence and persecution driven so 
many people from their homes. . . . So far, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 200,000 
Syrians. . . . The Syrian crisis has set unenviable records, producing almost four million 
refugees, more than any other modern conflict, and forcibly displacing more than seven 
million internally, the vast majority as a result of the Assad regime’s campaign of 
destruction.”); Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
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2014.2 This failure to reach a resolution in Syria may have been due 
to misunderstandings, including differing cultural perspectives and 
the preferences of the mediating parties and their mediator, Brahimi.3  
A mediator’s nationality and cultural background can influence 
how he conducts mediations and how the parties of the mediation 
perceive him and his methods.4 In the mediation process a mediator’s 
role is to assist the disputants in communicating with each other, 
identify and clarify issues, and consider available options in order to 
reach a consensual agreement that is fair and equitable to the parties.5 
To achieve these objectives, it is recommended by most codes of 
conduct for mediators that a mediator remain neutral and impartial.6 It 
is also crucial that the parties involved in the mediation believe that 
the mediator is trustworthy and neutral with respect to the issues 
involved in the conflict because this will allow the parties to be 
comfortable with his guidance and, as a result, come to an uncoerced 
agreement.7  
The cultural perspectives of the participants influence the 
character and circumstances of a mediation.8 Differing cultural 
                                                            
2. Infra notes 270-83 (explaining Brahimi’s mediation between the Syrian opposition 
and government).  
3. Infra notes 319-28 (discussing how cultural differences and expectations stymied 
progress in Brahimi’s mediation in Syria).  
4. See Walter A. Wright, Cultural Issues in Mediation: Individualist and Collectivist 
Paradigms, MEDIATE.COM (Jan. 2000), http://www.mediate.com/pfriendly.cfm?id=57 
(discussing how individualist and collectivist cultural values influence mediation methods); 
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Harold I. Abramson, Mediating Multiculturally: Culture 
and the Ethical Mediator, in MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES & COMMENTARIES 305-38, (Ellen 
Waldman ed., 2011); Cheryl Rivers, Lying Cheating Foreigners! Negotiation Ethics across 
Cultures, 12 INT’L NEGOTIATION 1 (2007).  
5. Hin Hung, Neutrality and Impartiality in Mediation, 5 ADR BULLETIN 3 (2002), art. 7 
at 1; Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator Be Neutral?, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV 831 (2012) 
(viewing “mediation as an efficient tool for facilitating agreement and gaining compliance 
among disputing persons about future-looking plans”).  
6. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Rachael Field, Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality, 3 
ADR BULLETIN 1, 16 (2000) (“Neutrality is a key concept in the process of mediation, with 
‘definitions of mediation frequently assert[ing] that the mediator is a neutral intervener in the 
parties’ dispute. For example, one of the most commonly accepted and often cited definitions 
provided by Folberg and Taylor refers to mediation as a process involving ‘the assistance of a 
neutral person or persons.’”); see also infra notes 52-116.  
7. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Field, supra note 6, at 16 (“This firm connection between 
neutrality and fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory is also related to 
neutrality's ‘important legitimising function for mediation.’ People are drawn to the mediation 
process on the basis of the perceived promise that neutrality holds.”). 
8. Wright, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 
(“Cultural lenses tint virtually every scene we encounter. . . . Experts in intercultural 
negotiation have identified a series of cultural features that influence disputing style.”). 
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ideologies have the potential to cause an impasse in the mediation if 
the participants’ views diverge on fundamental issues such as 
individual autonomy and group interdependence.9 Cultural 
experiences also influence the participants’ expectations of the 
mediator’s role.10 Consequently, complications may arise if the 
mediator—due to his nationality or background—identifies with one 
party’s culture more than another’s.11 
This Comment examines how a mediator’s nationality can 
influence the mediating parties’ and communities’ perceptions of his 
neutrality and how cultural differences play a role in the ethical 
expectations of a cross-cultural mediator. Part I discusses the role of 
neutrality in cross-cultural mediation and how neutrality is required 
and interpreted by codified ethical standards for mediators in the 
United States and in several international organizations. Part II 
discusses the role of culture in mediation, how culture influences 
ethical expectations, and the case studies of George Mitchell, a 
mediator in Ireland and Israel-Palestine, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a 
mediator in Syria.12 Mitchell and Brahimi are examples of mediators 
who worked with cultures that had different ethical expectations of 
the mediator’s role than they were accustomed to in their respective 
                                                            
9. Wright, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 305 
(“Occasionally, though, the clash of cultures will lead to ethical conundrums. Although all 
ethical problems are challenging . . . cross-cultural ethical dilemmas are particularly agonizing 
because they seem to require a choice between deeply felt cultural traditions. Amid current 
heightened sensitivities attending changes of Western cultural domination, the act of choosing 
in this context seems particularly fraught.”).  
10. Wright, supra note 4, at 4 (“Individualists tend to prefer professional mediators who 
have specialized training in mediation procedures. In individualist context, the mediator 
usually is expected to be impartial, with no undisclosed relationship to any disputant. Among 
collectivists, there tends to be less of a concern about professional credentials and impartiality, 
but more of a concern that the mediator be an insider, someone who knows the parties or at 
least the context of their dispute.”); Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311 
(“When mediators are working with disputants from different cultures, he (Hal Abramson) 
advises they (1) understand their own culture, (2) research the other culture, (3) bridge any 
cultural gap, and, when appropriate, (4) consider withdrawal.”). 
11.  Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311  
(discussing the ethical preferences of mediator’s and mediating parties depending on their 
culture and nationality and how to avoid mediator partiality toward one culture over another 
while performing a mediation). 
12. See infra notes 178-294 (Mitchell mediated in Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1995 
and finished with a resolution called the Good Friday Agreement. He also began mediating in 
Israel-Palestine in 2009 and resigned after two years without a resolution. Brahimi began 
mediating in Syria in 2012 and resigned from this mediation in 2014 without a resolution).  
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cultures.13 They both resigned in frustration and experienced great 
difficulty and public ridicule during their terms.14 Part III analyzes 
Mitchell and Brahimi’s trials and failures in their mediations, and 
provides suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural 
mediations. Through this analysis this Comment clarifies the role of 
neutrality in mediation and how a mediator’s nationality influences 
how mediating parties and their communities perceive his neutrality. 
I. NEUTRALITY AND ITS ROLE IN ESTABLISHED ETHICAL 
STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS 
This Section explores the standardized role of neutrality in 
mediation and examines what is expected of mediators legally and 
socially in different cultures. The role of neutrality has proven to be 
an important element in international and cross-cultural mediation as 
it has been codified in the ethical standards for mediators in several 
countries, including the United States and Australia, and in the 
standards for mediators drafted by international organizations, 
including the United Nations and the International Chamber of 
Commerce.15 Part I.A discusses definitions and interpretations of 
neutrality and how confidence in a mediator’s neutrality has a 
legitimizing function in mediation. Part I.B examines ethical 
standards for mediators codified by the United States and 
international organizations focusing on their requirements for 
neutrality.  
A. The Role of Neutrality in International and Cross Cultural 
Mediation 
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of mediation 
describes it is as a process involving “the assistance of a neutral 
person or persons.”16 The connection between neutrality and the 
fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory emphasizes 
                                                            
13.  See infra notes 178-294 (discussing Mitchell and Brahimi’s challenges in gaining 
momentum with the mediating parties and coming to a resolution in Israel-Palestine and 
Syria). 
14.  See infra notes 178-294 (discussing the circumstances that Mitchell and Brahimi 
were under when they resigned from their mediations, Mitchell in Israel-Palestine and Brahimi 
in Syria).  
15. Infra notes 49-119 (pointing out the sections of these codified ethical standards that 
address the importance of neutrality in mediation).  
16. Field, supra note 6 (pointing out that mediator neutrality is an important part of 
mediation); Hung, supra note 5. 
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neutrality’s “important legitimizing function for mediation.”17 Many 
people are drawn to mediation because it offers the promise of 
neutrality, which in turn allows the parties to feel confident in the 
fairness and legitimacy of the outcome they may reach through 
mediation.18  
There are many differing opinions about the role of neutrality in 
mediation.19 Some writers consider neutrality to be the most pervasive 
and misleading myth about mediation and argue that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to attain.20 Some scholars also believe that 
mediators have considerable power in mediation and that there is 
evidence that they do not always exercise that power in a neutral way 
as to the content and outcome.21 This virtue of indifference to the 
outcome is not always beneficial to the mediation because there are 
times when mediators should intervene and question the parties, 
which does not draw away from the legitimacy of the mediation at 
hand.22 Therefore it is not sufficient to claim mediator neutrality to 
legitimize and praise the mediation process.23  
The Oxford Dictionary defines “neutral” as “not helping or 
supporting either side in a conflict.”24 The Oxford Dictionary also 
                                                            
17. Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5 (discussing how neutrality instills 
confidence and validity in the practice of mediation). 
18.  Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5  (illuminating that parties are attracted 
to the mediation process because a neutral mediator has the capacity to yield a lasting and 
valid resolution). 
19. See Field, supra note 6; see also Hung, supra note 5 (explaining how scholars and 
writers have differing opinions of whether a mediator can be neutral). 
20. Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5, at 1 (“A neutral mediator has been 
described by Roger Fisher as ‘an eunuch from mars, totally powerless (and totally neutral).’ 
The description may imply that a neutral and impartial mediator should be asexual and without 
any kind of worldly connection.”). 
21. Field, supra note 6, at 1 (citing HILLARY ASTOR AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA, 102 (1992)); Hung, supra note 5, at 2 (“Being ‘neutral and 
impartial’ does not mean that a mediator is totally indifferent to the outcome or the process of 
mediation . . . There will be situations where the mediator will intervene and the question is 
when should the intervention take place and to what degree.”). 
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (acknowledging that when a mediator 
interjects during a mediation it does not mean that he is not being neutral toward the parties to 
the mediation).  
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining that having a “neutral” 
mediator does not guarantee a seamless, fair and valid outcome in the mediation process). 
24. Neutral, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014) (“Not helping or supporting either 
side in a conflict, disagreement, etc.”); Neutral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014) 
(“Neutral: not supporting either side of an argument, fight, war, etc.”). 
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defines “impartial” as “treating all disputants equally.”25 In many 
mediator codes of ethics, including the United States Model Standard 
of Conduct and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Rules of 
Conduct, these terms are not well defined or are defined in various 
and contradictory ways that result in confusion.26 For example, in the 
WTO Rules of Conduct, the term “impartial” is never properly 
defined in the text even though it is used several times in the text of 
the rules.27 The US Model Standards describe that “a mediator shall 
conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that 
gives the appearance of partiality.”28 In contrast, the International 
Mediation Institute Code of Professional Conduct explains that 
mediators “shall act in an unbiased manner, treating all parties with 
fairness, quality and respect.”29 These different standards make it 
confusing for mediators trying to abide by both codes of conduct.30  
Because mediation differs from litigation, which develops over 
many years with precise checks and balances, such as case law and 
enforceable statutes, there has been confusion in the standards and 
laws governing mediation.31 Mediation does not have such well-
                                                            
25. Impartial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014) (“Treating all rivals or disputants 
equally; fair and just.”); Impartial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014) (“Impartial: 
treating all people and groups equally: not partial or biased.”). 
26. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Field, supra note 6 (“Theoretically, neutrality is a concept 
with many different elements of meaning and understanding. The broadest sense of the term 
includes issues such as a lack of interest in the outcome of the dispute, a lack of bias towards 
one of the parties, a lack of prior knowledge of the dispute and/or the parties, the absence of 
the mediator making a judgment about the parties and their dispute, and the idea that the 
mediator will be fair and evenhanded . . . neutrality is used more to describe a mediator’s sense 
of disinterest in the outcome of the dispute, impartiality is said to refer to ‘an even-handedness, 
objectivity and fairness towards the parties during the mediation process.’”); see infra notes 
32-41, 56-68 and accompanying text.  
27. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (acknowledging the shortcomings of 
the WTO Rules of Conduct). 
28. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the way the impartiality is 
defined in the US Model Standards). 
29. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining how the International 
Mediation Institute Code of Professional Conduct’s definition of impartiality differs from the 
US Model Standards by putting an emphasis on “fairness, quality and respect” to achieve 
impartiality in mediation). 
30. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that different standards cause 
confusion).  
31. Hung, supra note 5, at 2 (citing ALEXANDER BEVAN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 34 (1992)); Stulberg, supra note 5, at 837 (“We could relax the demanding 
standard of perfect procedural justice and posit mediation as an instance of ‘imperfect 
procedural justice.’ In this . . . situation, the desired outcome is still defined and embraced 
independently of the process—e.g., outcomes mandated by or consistent with the law—but we 
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developed checks and balances, and aside from several unenforceable 
codes of conduct, a skilled, reasonable, and trusted mediator is an 
agent of fairness and legitimacy for the mediation process.32 
Therefore, the principle of non-partisan fairness is the foundation and 
standard for the ethics of mediation.33 This makes the legal standards 
for mediators fairly ambiguous because cultures view fairness and 
neutrality in different ways.34  
Mediators may experience ethical difficulties with regard to 
neutrality when the disputants have dramatically differing cultural 
conceptualizations of identity, language, infrastructure, and 
government.35 Where parties’ cultural norms and conceptualizations 
conflict, and where they differ drastically from those of the mediator, 
facilitating an agreement may become ethically problematic for the 
mediator.36 Hal Abramson, an experienced cross-cultural mediator, 
suggests a four-step approach for mediators in cross-cultural 
negotiations.37 He suggests that when mediators are working with 
disputants from different cultures they should (1) understand their 
                                                                                                                                     
acknowledge that the mediation process might have other institutional values, such as party 
autonomy, that permit parties in some instances to reach outcomes that fail that standard.”). 
32. Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Field, supra note 6, at 1 (“This firm connection between 
neutrality and fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory is also related to 
neutrality’s ‘important legitimizing function for mediation.’”); see also infra notes 49-120 and 
accompanying text.  
33. Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Ronit Zamir, The Disempowering Relationship Between 
Mediator Neutrality and Judicial Impartiality: Toward a New Mediation Ethic, 11 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L. J. 467 (2011) (“([Neutrality] is considered a necessary condition not only for 
conducting proper mediation but also for the very existence of the process called mediation. 
The absence of neutrality undercuts the foundations of mediation, so that it is no longer 
mediation but some other process altogether.”). 
34.  Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Zamir, supra note 33; see also infra notes 156-75 and 
accompanying text.  
35.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Experts in intercultural 
negotiation have identified a series of cultural features that influence disputing style. These 
features reflect different cultural conceptualizations of identity, language, and structure. If 
disputants bring to the mediation table dramatically differing expectations of how individuals 
fit into group hierarchies and communicated within and between them, mediation becomes 
more of a challenge.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 1 (“Every mediation has a unique character 
influenced by the cultural perspectives of its participants. Differences in perspectives may 
impede an agreement if the participants’ views diverge on such fundamental issues as 
individual autonomy and group interdependence.”). 
36. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Often stylistic differences 
require the mediator to constantly explain, reinterpret and reframe. In some situations, the 
parties’ norms will be so different from both the mediator’s and each other’s that helping forge 
agreement will prove ethically problematic.”); Wright supra note 4.  
37. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; see Michael W. Morris & Ho-
Ying Fu, How Does Culture Influence Conflict Resolution? A Dynamic Constructivist 
Analysis, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 324 (2001) (introducing Abramson’s four step approach). 
2016] DOES NATIONALITY INFLUENCE NEUTRALITY? 703 
own culture; (2) research the other culture; (3) bridge any cultural 
gap, and, when appropriate; (4) consider withdrawal.38 
Abramson first suggests that a mediator understand his own 
culture to evaluate his own cultural expectations and biases when 
entering a mediation.39 By doing this he will come to understand his 
negotiating style, which his culture significantly influences, and 
become aware that it is improper to favor his style over another.40 
Next, the mediator should research both parties’ cultures and gain a 
better understanding of their cultural views of relationships, language, 
negotiating pace, and structure.41 Abramson suggests that this will 
allow the mediator to function more effectively when engaging in 
dialogue with the parties.42 
After considering the cultures of both parties the mediator can 
try to bridge cultural divides by educating each party about the other’s 
cultural behaviors that may be present in the negotiation.43 This will 
help them approach each other with a more open and accepting 
mindset.44 Lastly, Abramson suggests that the mediator address 
whether the end result of the mediation is congruent with his own 
                                                            
38.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; Morris & Fu, supra note 37  
(discussing Abramson’s four step approach and illuminating the importance of culture in this 
approach). 
39.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; Morris & Fu, supra note 37  
(emphasizing how a mediator understanding his own inherent cultural biases can lead to a 
more neutral and legitimate mediation process). 
40. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“If the mediator scrutinizes her 
own background, she will come to understand that her negotiating style is heavily culturally 
determined. She will see that predilections for meandering versus strictly cosseted meetings, 
for vague versus meticulous drafting, or for formal versus informal manners of speech are 
equally valid choices, and that it would be improper for her to favor one cultural style over 
another.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.  
41. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (for example, because a party is 
“from Asia, the mediator should inquire into Asian practices and gather as much information 
as possible about prevailing cultural norms of the area.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.  
42. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“One the mediator gains a 
better understanding of the buyer’s view of relationships, language, negotiating pace, and 
structure, she can function more effectively as interlocutor.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra 
note 37.  
43.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“At this point, the mediator can 
attempt to bridge the cultural divide by helping educate each party about the other’s culturally 
driven behavior and help them approach one another with a more open and accepting mind.”); 
see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.  
44.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (for example, “the mediator 
might explain to the impatient seller (party) that the buyer (party) is working with a different 
set of goals for the negotiation. She might help the seller see that the buyer’s elliptical use of 
language fits into his larger notion of keeping relations harmonious”); see also Morris & Fu, 
supra note 37.  
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sense of ethics and professionalism.45 It is possible that the cultural 
differences between the parties have already damaged their trust of 
one another and misunderstandings have reached such a point where 
the mediator is unable to facilitate common ground between the 
parties.46 In some cases achieving common ground between disputing 
parties is not enough to gain a successful resolution between them if 
the person mediating the case is not comfortable or equipped to 
navigate the parties to this shared objective.47 
B. Established Ethical Standards of Neutrality for Mediators 
As explained previously, neutrality and fairness are viewed as 
important legitimizing aspects in the practice of mediation and have 
been exemplified in many codes of ethics for mediators.48 Several 
countries, including the United States and Australia, have codified 
ethical requirements for mediations.49 International organizations such 
as the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), International 
Mediation Institute (“IMI”), and the United Nations also have 
codified ethical requirements for mediators.50 These requirements 
have neutrality standards for mediators and ethical guidelines for 
mediations.51  
i. United States 
The United States has codified the Model Standards of Conduct 
for Mediators (“US Model Standards”).52 The goals of these ethical 
                                                            
45.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“In some multicultural disputes 
. . . the culture clash leads to ethical problems.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.  
46.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“Working with culturally 
diverse parties, a mediator needs to consider whether the end result comports with her own 
sense of ethics and professionalism.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.  
47.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“In some cases, the question is 
not whether the mediator can locate common ground, but whether the ground that one or both 
parties insist on occupying is terrain the mediator feels comfortable sharing.”); see also Morris 
& Fu, supra note 37.  
48. Infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of standards 
of neutrality in many different ethical requirements and suggestions for mediators). 
49. Infra notes 53 and 77 and accompanying text (noting the US Model Standards and 
Australian Standards). 
50. Infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text (noting the ICC Mediation Rules, IMI 
Code of Professional Conduct and UN Guidance for Effective Mediation).  
51. Infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text. 
52. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. ARB. ASSOC. 2005); (AM. 
BAR ASSOC. 2005); (ASSOC. FOR CONFLICT RES. 2005) [hereinafter US Model Standards] 
(“The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators was prepared in 1994 by the American 
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guidelines are to guide the conduct of mediations, inform the 
mediating parties, and promote the public confidence in mediation.53 
Although the US Model Standards do not have the force of law, 
unless and until adopted by a court or other regulatory authority, they 
should alert mediators that the US Model Standards might be viewed 
as a standard of care for mediations.54  
Self determination, impartiality, conflicts of interest, and 
competence are four standards included in this model code that 
implicate the mediator’s neutrality.55 The US Model Standards define 
“self determination” as the act of mediation participants coming to a 
voluntary uncoerced decision where each party makes free and 
informed choices.56 This standard requires that a mediator not 
undermine a party’s self determination for numerous reasons.57 In 
order to do this, the mediator’s country of origin and the people and 
views of that country must not affect his judgment when mediating.58 
According to the US Model Standards, impartiality is “freedom 
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”59 The standard of impartiality 
requires that a mediator not be prejudiced in reaction to a participant’s 
personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs, performance 
at a mediation, or any other reason.60 This standard also requires a 
mediator to withdraw if he cannot conduct mediations in an impartial 
manner.61 
                                                                                                                                     
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, and 
the Association for Conflict Resolution.”).  
53.  Id. at 2 (“These ethical guidelines serve three primary goals: (1) to guide the conduct 
of mediations; (2) to inform the mediating parties; and (3) to promote the public confidence in 
mediation as a process for resolving disputes.”). 
54. Id. at 3 (“These Standards, unless and until adopted by a court or other regulatory 
authority do not have the force of law. Nonetheless, the fact that these Standards have been 
adopted by the respective sponsoring entities, should alert mediators to the fact that the 
Standards might be viewed as establishing a standard of care for mediators.”).  
55. Id. at 2-4 (outlining the standards in the US Model Standards that acknowledge the 
importance of neutrality and impartiality in mediation). 
56. Id. at 3 (“Self Determination is an act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision 
in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome.”). 
57. Id. at 4 (“A mediator shall not undermine party self-determination by any party for 
reasons such as higher settlement rates and egos, increased fees, or outside pressures from 
court personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the media or others.”). 
58. Id. (emphasizing the role of the mediator’s country of origin). 
59. Id. (“A mediator shall decline a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an 
impartial manner. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”). 
60. Id. (listing qualities of mediating parties that a mediator shall not have prejudice 
against).  
61. Id. (“If at any time a mediator is unable to conduct a mediation in an impartial 
manner, the mediator shall withdraw.”). 
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Under the US Model Standards, mediators are required to avoid 
conflicts of interest.62 The Model Standards indicate that a conflict of 
interest can arise from a mediator’s relationship with the dispute or 
with a mediation participant.63 The mediator’s nationality and his 
country of origin’s relationship with a mediation participant and the 
dispute can create a conflict of interest that could affect the outcome 
of the mediation.64 An example of this was George Mitchell’s 
mediation in Israel-Palestine from 2009-2011 where the political 
relationship between the United States, Mitchell’s home country, and 
Israel created a conflict of interest and Palestinian distrust of Mitchell, 
which stymied progress in this mediation.65 
The standard of competence, which requires that a person 
selected as a mediator should possess cultural understanding and 
impartiality among other qualities, includes concern for cultural 
biases.66 This concern is reflected in the list of necessary qualities of a 
mediator including cultural understanding, which shows a concern for 
neutrality in multi-cultural mediations.67 These requirements in the 
US Model Standards exemplify that the United States is making 
efforts to create mediator standards of neutrality that indirectly 
recognize and account for cultural differences.68 
                                                            
62. Id. (“A mediator shall avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of 
interest during and after a mediation.”). 
63. Id. (“A conflict of interest can arise from involvement by a mediator with the subject 
matter of the dispute or from any relationship between a mediator and any mediation 
participant, whether past or present, personal or professional, that reasonably raises a question 
of a mediator’s impartiality.”). 
64. Id. (explaining how a micro example of a conflict of interest being caused by a 
mediator’s relationship with one party in the mediation can be the same on a macro level as 
well when a country involved in facilitating a mediation can cause a conflict of interest by 
having a relationship with a country that is a party to the mediation). 
65. Id.; see infra notes 221-65 and accompanying text (describing Mitchell’s difficulties 
mediating in a country where one party, the Palestinians, considered Mitchell impartial 
because of the relationship between Mitchell’s home country and the other party in the 
mediation, Israel).  
66. US Model Standards, supra note 52, at 5-6 (“Any person may be selected as a 
mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied with the mediator’s competence and 
qualifications. Training, experience in mediation, skills, cultural understandings and other 
qualities are often necessary for mediator competence.”). 
67. Id. (highlighting the mediator quality of cultural understanding). 
68.  See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM ARB. ASSOC. 2005) 
(emphasizing the sections of the US Model Standards that include and illuminate the 
importance of neutrality and cultural understanding in the practice of mediation). 
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ii. Australia 
The work and theories developed by US professional groups, 
such as the American Arbitration Association and American Bar 
Association, provide the basis for the Australian Ethical Standards for 
Mediators (“Australian Standards”).69 The Australian Standards are 
offered in an educational capacity to provide an ethical and practical 
framework to assist mediators.70 They are merely guidelines for 
mediators and are not enforceable.71 The Australian Ethical Standards 
set forth the same goals for mediation standards as the US Model 
Standards.72 Under the Australian Standards, the mediation process is 
facilitated by an impartial person whose job is to promote an 
uncoerced agreement and enable the parties to reach their own 
agreement.73 
The Australian Standards include a requirement that the 
mediator must avoid partiality or prejudice and conduct that gives an 
appearance of partiality or prejudice.74 If the mediator is unable to act 
impartially he must withdraw from the mediation.75 There is also a 
                                                            
69.  ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS 2 (LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA 2011) 
(“These guidelines are based on the work of four professional groups in the United States: The 
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the Society of Professionals 
in Dispute Resolution, and the Association for Conflict Resolution. They were reworked for 
Australia in 1996 by members of the Law Council of Australia Expert Standing Committee on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. . . . They were further reviewed and updated by the Committee 
in February 2000 and in February 2006. . . . In its February 2006 review, the Committee 
adopted some aspects of the Draft European Code of Conduct for Mediators, April 2004 on 
Independence and Neutrality.”).  
70. Id. (“The Law Council of Australia has developed these guidelines to serve as a 
general ethical and practical framework for the practice of mediation. The guidelines are 
intended to apply to all types of mediation. . . . They are offered in the hope that they will 
serve an educational function and provide assistance to individuals, organisations and 
institutions involved in mediation in all practice contexts.”).  
71. Id. (highlighting that the Australian guidelines are intended for educational and 
instructional purposes). 
72. Id. (“The guidelines are intended to perform three major functions: To serve as a 
guide for the conduct of mediators; To inform the mediating parties of what they should 
expect; and To promote public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes.”). 
73. Id. at 4 (“Mediation is a process in which an impartial person – a mediator – 
facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting uncoerced agreement by the parties to the 
dispute. A mediator facilitates communication, promotes understanding, assists the parties to 
identify their needs and interests, and uses creative problem solving techniques to enable the 
parties to reach their own agreement.”). 
74. Id. (“Accordingly a mediator must avoid: (i) partiality or prejudice; and (ii) conduct 
that gives any appearance of partiality or prejudice.”). 
75. Id. (“A mediator may mediate only those matters in which the mediator can remain 
impartial and even handed. If at any time the mediator is unable to conduct the process in an 
impartial manner the mediator should withdraw.”). 
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criterion that speaks to issues of impartiality associated with a 
mediator’s beliefs coming from their national or cultural 
backgrounds.76 The inclusion of this criterion in the Australian 
Standards is significant because it acknowledges that cultural biases 
and conflicts are issues that should be addressed directly in 
mediation.77 
iii. International Standards 
The following requirements for mediators established by 
international organizations are guidelines for practice and are not 
binding for mediators.78 The United Nations Guidance for Effective 
Mediation is used by the Mediation Support Unit (“MSU”), which is a 
service provider that assists the mediation and facilitation initiatives 
of the United Nations (“UN”), Member States, regional/subregional 
organizations, and other relevant partners.79 The IMI Code of 
Professional Conduct provides parties mediating through the IMI with 
a statement of ethical standards they can expect from mediators from 
the IMI who chose to adopt these standards.80 WTO Rules of Conduct 
were put in place to strengthen the WTO Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”) and were 
designed to maintain the integrity, impartiality, and confidentiality of 
proceedings done under the DSU.81 Moreover, the ICC Mediation 
                                                            
76. Id. at 5 (“Whatever their own views and standards mediators should not only not be 
partial or prejudiced but should avoid the appearance of partiality or prejudice by reason of 
such matters as the parties’ personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs or conduct 
at the mediation.”).  
77. Id. (highlighting the acknowledgement of cultural biases as an issue in mediation). 
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the later discussed 
international organization’s standards for the conduct of mediators are not codified or binding 
for mediators). 
79. UNITED NATIONS GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION (UNITED NATIONS 2012), 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA
2012%28english%29_0.pdf (“The Guidance is disseminated by the Mediation Support Unit 
(MSU), based in the Policy and Mediation Division of the Department of Political Affairs.”). 
80. IMI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,(INT'L MEDIATION INST. 2015) (“The IMI 
Code of Professional Conduct (“the Code”) provides users of mediation services with a 
concise statement of the ethical standards they can expect from Mediators who choose to adopt 
its terms and sets standards that they can be expected to meet.”). 
81. World Trade Organization, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 (1996) 
(“Affirming that the operation of the DSU would be strengthened by rules of conduct designed 
to maintain the integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the 
DSU thereby enhancing confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism; Hereby 
establish the following Rules of Conduct.”); World Trade Organization, Understanding on 
2016] DOES NATIONALITY INFLUENCE NEUTRALITY? 709 
Rules provide guidelines for mediation and are only used in mediation 
proceedings administered by the ICC International Centre for ADR 
under their procedures.82 The following Sections will discuss how 
these international organizations’ guidelines explain and emphasize 
impartiality and neutrality. 
a. United Nations  
The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (“UN 
Guidance”) is designed to support professional mediation efforts 
around the world and provide a reference to mediators.83 It 
encompasses experiences of mediators working on international, 
national, and local levels and draws from the participants who have 
benefited and suffered from successful and failed mediation 
processes.84 The UN Guidance aims to help strengthen mediating 
parties’ understanding of effective mediation.85 It is intended to be a 
resource for mediators, States, and other actors supporting mediation 
efforts as well as conflict parties, civil society, and other stakeholders 
in the conflict at hand.86 
The UN Guidance identifies key fundamentals that should be 
considered in a mediation effort, including consent, impartiality, 
                                                                                                                                     
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (2015), https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_01_e.htm (The rules and procedures of the DSU 
apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the 
agreements listed in its Appendix 1, disputes between Members concerning their rights and 
obligations under provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and dispute settlements 
contained in the covered agreements as identified in its Appendix 2). 
82. International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Mediation Rules (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/mediation/rules/ (“Mediation shall 
be used under the Rules unless, prior to the confirmation or appointment of the Mediator or 
with the agreement of the Mediator, the parties agree upon a different settlement procedure or 
a combination of settlement procedures.”).  
83. See United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.un.
org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Me
diation.pdf [hereinafter UN Guidance] (“The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation 
is designed to support professional and credible mediation efforts around the world.”). 
84. Id. (“This concise reference document encompasses the wealth of experience of 
mediators working at the international, national and local levels. It also draws on the views of 
beneficiaries of successful mediation processes as well as those who have suffered from failed 
mediation attempts.”). 
85. Id. (“While all disputes and conflicts are unique and require specific approaches, 
there are good practices that should inform the approaches of all mediators.”). 
86. Id. at 2 (“the Guidance aims to inform the design and management of mediation 
processes . . . It emphasizes the need for a good understanding of mediation and an 
appreciation of both its potential and limits as a means for conflict prevention, management 
and resolution”). 
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inclusivity, and national ownership.87 It also provides indicators that 
suggest the potential for effective mediation, which include that a 
mediator be accepted, credible, and well supported.88 In the section 
about consent, the UN Guidance points out that the integrity of the 
mediation process, security, confidentiality, and the acceptability of 
the mediator and the mediating entity are important in achieving the 
consent of the parties.89 This section encourages the mediator to use 
confidence-building measures to build trust between the mediator and 
the parties and between the parties themselves.90 It also stresses that 
the mediator be consistent, transparent, and even-handed when 
managing the mediation process.91 
The UN Guidance describes impartiality as a “cornerstone of 
mediation” and explains that a mediator being perceived as biased can 
undermine the progress of a mediation.92 It also suggests that 
mediators address the issue of impartiality by: ensuring and 
demonstrating that the process and treatment of the parties is fair and 
balanced; being transparent with the parties about the laws and norms 
that guide their involvement; not accepting support from external 
actors who would affect the impartiality of the mediation; avoiding 
association with punitive measures against the parties and minimizing 
public criticism of the parties as much as possible; and handing over 
the conflict to another mediator or mediating entity if they feel unable 
                                                            
87. Id. at 3 (“To address these issues, the Guidance identifies a number of key 
fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort: preparedness; consent; 
impartiality; inclusivity; national ownership; international law and normative frameworks; 
coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and quality peace 
agreements.”). 
88. Id. at 5 (“There are some indicators that suggest the potential for effective mediation. 
First and most importantly, the main conflict parties must be open to trying to negotiate a 
settlement; second, a mediator must be accepted, credible and well supported; and third, there 
must be general consensus at the regional and international levels to support the process.”). 
89. Id. at 8 (“The integrity of the mediation process, security and confidentiality are 
important elements in cultivating the consent of the parties, along with the acceptability of the 
mediator and the mediating entity.”). 
90. Id. at 9 (“Use confidence-building measures at different stages to build trust between 
the conflict parties and between the mediator and the parties, as well as confidence in the 
mediation process.”). 
91. Id. (“Be consistent, transparent and even-handed in managing the mediation process, 
and respect confidentiality.”). 
92. Id. at 10 (“Impartiality is a cornerstone of mediation – if a mediation process is 
perceived to be biased, this can undermine meaningful progress to resolve the conflict. A 
mediator should be able to run a balanced process that treats all actors fairly and should not 
have a material interest in the outcome. This also requires that the mediator is able to talk with 
all actors relevant to resolving the conflict.”).  
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to sustain a balanced and impartial approach.93 Furthermore, the 
inclusivity and national ownership sections of the UN Guidance, 
which follow, explain who should be involved in the mediation 
process.94 Inclusivity increases the legitimacy and national ownership 
of peace agreements and their implementation, and connects to 
impartiality by ensuring that the process is not undermined by the 
exclusion of necessary parties from a mediation or peace process and 
that different perspectives are included in the process.95  
The UN Guidance provides guidelines for mediators and 
fundamental concepts that mediators should address while 
mediating.96 These guidelines also show that the United Nations 
acknowledges that mediators should be educated and guided in a 
positive and productive direction when conducting mediations.97 The 
UN Guidance stresses the importance of impartiality for mediators, 
mirroring the national concerns exhibited in the US Model Standards 
and Australian Standards.98 
b. International Mediation Institute 
The IMI created the IMI Code of Professional Conduct, which 
provides ethical guidelines for mediators.99 Its introduction 
emphasizes that without trust in the mediator’s integrity—which 
                                                            
93. Id. (listing the suggestions for how mediators should address the issue of 
impartiality). 
94. Id. at 11-14 (“Inclusivity refers to the extent and manner in which the views and 
needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process 
and outcome of a mediation effort . . . National ownership implies that conflict parties and the 
broader society commit to the mediation process, agreements and their implementation.”).  
95. Id. at 11 (“An inclusive process is more likely to identify and address the root causes 
of conflict and ensure that the needs of the affected sectors of the population are addressed. 
Inclusivity also increases the legitimacy and national ownership of the peace agreement and its 
implementation. In addition, it reduces the likelihood of excluded actors undermining the 
process. An inclusive process does not imply that all stakeholders participate directly in the 
formal negotiations, but facilitates interaction between the conflict parties and other 
stakeholders and creates mechanisms to include all perspectives in the process.”).  
96. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (summarizing the UN Guidance). 
97.  See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (highlighting the UN’s concern for 
the education of international mediators). 
98.  See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text; infra notes 103-21 and 
accompanying text (comparing the UN Guidance to the US Model Standards and the 
Australian Standards). 
99. See IMI Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 80, at 1 (“IMI Certified Mediators 
are required to make known to users which code of conduct governs their professional 
mediation practice. They are not required to select this Code provided they have subscribed to 
a code, and that they indicate this to users.”). 
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includes neutrality, independence, impartiality, and fairness—
mediation is unlikely to succeed.100 Section 2.2 focuses specifically 
on the independence, neutrality, and impartiality of a mediator.101  
Section 2.2.1 emphasizes the mediator’s duty to disclose, 
providing that a mediator may not accept an appointment without 
disclosing anything that would affect her independence, neutrality, or 
impartiality.102 Section 2.2.2 explains that the existence of any 
circumstances affecting the mediator’s independence, neutrality, or 
impartiality, if not disclosed, will imply unfitness to act as a 
mediator.103 Section 2.3.3 requires that the mediator act in an 
unbiased manner and describes circumstances in which the mediator 
would be considered biased, and, consequently, would need to 
withdraw from mediation.104 Section 2.3.1 also requires that 
mediators determine if there are any conflicts of interest or potential 
biases and imposes a duty to disclose them.105 The IMI’s emphasis on 
trust, neutrality, and disclosure of any biases provides guidance for 
international mediators on important factors of cross-cultural 
mediation.106  
                                                            
100. Id. at 1 (exemplifying how the IMI Code of Professional Conduct puts great 
emphasis on trust in the mediation process). 
101. Id. at 2 (outlining this section of the IMI Code of Professional Conduct). 
102. Id. (“2.2.1 Mediators will not accept an appointment without first disclosing 
anything within their knowledge that may, or may be seen to, materially affect their 
independence neutrality or impartiality. This duty to disclose is a continuing obligation 
throughout the mediation process.”). 
103. Id. (“2.2.2 The existence of circumstances potentially affecting, or appearing to 
affect, a Mediator’s independence, neutrality or impartiality will not automatically imply 
unfitness to act as a mediator provided these circumstances have been fully disclosed and 
address to the satisfaction of the parties and the Mediator.”). 
104. Id. (“2.2.3 Mediators will always act in an independent, neutral and impartial way. 
They shall act in an unbiased manner, treating all parties with fairness, quality and respect. If 
at any time a Mediator feels unable to conduct the process in an independent neutral and 
impartial manner, (s)he will express that concern and will offer to withdraw from the 
mediation. Such circumstances include: financial or personal interests in the outcome of the 
mediation; existing past or future financial, business or professional relationship with any of 
the parties or their representatives about with the Mediator is aware; other potential source of 
bias or prejudice concerning a person or institution which may affect that Mediator’s 
independence, neutrality or impartiality or reasonably create an appearance of partiality or 
bias.”). 
105. Id. at 3 (“2.3.1 Mediators will conduct reasonable inquiries to determine if any 
interests, conflicts of interests or potential biases may exist. They will have a continuing duty 
to disclose any interests, conflicts of interests or potential biases that may become apparent 
during the mediation process.”). 
106. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (connecting the underpinnings of 
the IMI Code of Professional Conduct to multi-cultural mediations). 
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c. World Trade Organization  
The WTO created the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(“WTO Rules of Conduct”) as a standard for dispute resolution.107 
These rules, like others previously discussed, require that each person 
involved in the dispute resolution be independent and impartial and 
maintain confidentiality.108 The people involved in the dispute 
resolution are also required to disclose any information that may 
affect their independence and impartiality.109 These rules provide an 
illustrative list of information to be disclosed.110 The WTO puts great 
emphasis on the disclosure of biases and importance of impartiality, 
which are important criteria for international mediators and are 
similar to the international guidelines of the United Nations and 
IMI.111  
d. International Chamber of Commerce  
The ICC created the ICC Mediation Rules as a flexible 
procedure to achieve a negotiated settlement with the assistance of a 
                                                            
107. See World Trade Organization, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 
1996) (summarizing the intended purpose of the WTO Rules of Conduct). 
108. Id. ¶ III.2 (“Pursuant to the Governing Principle, each covered person, shall be 
independent and impartial, and shall maintain confidentiality.”). 
109. Id. ¶ VI.2 (“[A]ll covered persons described in paragraph VI.1(a) and VI.1(b) shall 
disclose any information that could reasonably be expected to be known to them at the time 
which, coming within the scope of the Governing Principle of these Rules, is likely to affect or 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. These disclosures 
include the type of information described in the Illustrative List, if relevant.”). 
110. Id. at annex 2 (“Each covered person, as defined in Section IV:1 of these Rules of 
Conduct has a continuing duty to disclose the information described in Section VI:2 of these 
Rules which may include the following: (a) financial interests (e.g. investments, loans, shares, 
interests, other debts); business interests (e.g. directorship or other contractual interests); and 
property interests relevant to the dispute in question; (b) professional interests (e.g. a past or 
present relationship with private clients, or any interests the person may have in domestic or 
international proceedings, and their implications, where these involve issues similar to those 
addressed in the dispute in question); (c) other active interests (e.g. active participation in 
public interest groups or other organisations which may have a declared agenda relevant to the 
dispute in question); d) considered statements of personal opinion on issues relevant to the 
dispute in question (e.g. publications, public statements); (e) employment or family interests 
(e.g. the possibility of any indirect advantage or any likelihood of pressure which could arise 
from their employer, business associates or immediate family members).”). 
111. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (comparing the WTO Rules of 
Conduct to the mediation standards of other international organizations). 
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neutral facilitator.112 The ICC Mediation Rules suggest the 
appointment of a neutral third party, the mediator, to assist the parties 
in settling their dispute.113 The rules require the mediator to sign a 
statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality, and independence, 
and to disclose any circumstances where the mediator’s independence 
or impartiality would be called into question.114  
The ICC must consider certain attributes when appointing a 
mediator, including nationality.115 The ICC Mediation Rules provide 
standards for the conduct of mediation.116 They require that the 
mediator and the parties discuss the manner in which the mediation 
will be conducted, and that the mediator provide a written note of this 
and guide the mediation by the wishes of the parties with fairness and 
impartiality.117  
Neutrality and fairness are important legitimizing aspects in the 
practice of mediation.118 Several countries have created standards to 
provide guidance and encouragement of these factors in 
mediations.119 Recognizing the need for clear and unified standards, 
international organizations have developed ethical codes to guide 
                                                            
112. See ICC Mediation Rules, supra note 82 (summarizing the purpose of the ICC 
Mediation Rules). 
113. See id. at 1 (describing an introductory provision of the ICC Mediation Rules). 
114. Id. at 2 (“Before appointment or confirmation, a prospective Mediator shall sign a 
statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence. The prospective Mediator 
shall disclose in writing to the Centre any facts or circumstances which might be of such a 
nature as to call into question the Mediator’s independence in the eyes of the parties, as well as 
any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to the Mediator’s impartiality. 
The Centre shall provide such information to the parties in writing and shall fix a time limit for 
any comments from them.”). 
115. Id. at 2 (“When confirming or appointing a Mediator, the Centre shall consider the 
prospective Mediator’s attributes, including but not limited to nationality, language skills, 
training, qualifications and experience, and the prospective Mediator’s availability and ability 
to conduct the mediation in accordance with the Rules.”). 
116. Id. at 3 (“The Mediator and the parties shall promptly discuss the manner in which 
the mediation shall be conducted.”). 
117. Id. (“After such discussion, the Mediator shall promptly provide the parties with a 
written note informing them of the manner in which the mediation shall be conducted. Each 
party, by agreeing to refer a dispute to the Rules, agrees to participate in the Proceedings at 
least until receipt of such note from the Mediator or earlier termination of the Proceedings 
pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Rules. In establishing and conducting the mediation, the 
Mediator shall be guided by the wishes of the parties and shall treat them with fairness and 
impartiality. Each party shall act in good faith throughout the mediation.”).  
118. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the standards set by the 
US Model Standards and the Australian Standards). 
119.  See supra notes 16-17  and accompanying text (acknowledging the international 
appreciation for neutrality).  
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mediations as well.120 These guidelines developed on national and 
international levels are examples of an acknowledgement of the 
importance of neutrality in mediation and provide important ethical 
guidance and criteria for mediators.121 
II. CULTURE AND NATIONALITY INFLUENCING ETHICAL 
EXPECTATIONS AND THE CASES OF GEORGE MITCHELL AND 
LAKHDAR BRAHIMI 
Culture influences theories on mediation tactics and ethics. Part 
II touches on how a mediator may identify with a party and its ideas 
based on her own culture and nationality. Part II.A explores how 
mediation tactics are used in individualist and collectivist cultures. 
Part II.B analyzes the cultural impact on parties’ ethical expectations 
of mediation and the ethical ambiguity that comes from the differing 
perspectives of individualists and collectivists when mediating with 
one another.  
Examples of mediators who were embraced and rejected by the 
mediating parties are presented in Part II.C. The experiences of 
George Mitchell and Lakhdar Brahimi demonstrate that mediators 
may be influenced by confidence or skepticism of their nationalities, 
culture and ethical preferences, and their neutrality in the mediation. 
Part II.C first describes Mitchell’s successful mediation in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland where he drafted the Good Friday Agreement and 
dealt with individualistic cultures similar to his own.  
Second, Part II.C describes Mitchell’s experience mediating in 
Israel–Palestine where his neutrality was called into question, he dealt 
with the clash between an individualist Israeli culture and a 
collectivist Palestinian culture, and withdrew from the mediation 
without facilitating a resolution. Finally, Part II.C explains Brahimi’s 
experiences mediating in Syria between the Syrian government and 
the opposition in the context of the Syrian Civil War. There, Brahimi 
dealt with individualist and collectivist dynamics, especially when the 
United States and Russia became involved in the talks between the 
parties, and eventually withdrew from this mediation in frustration 
and without any settlements or resolutions between the parties.  
                                                            
120. See supra notes 78-116 and accompanying text (discussing the standards set by the 
UN, IMI, ICC and WTO). 
121. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (emphasizing the commonality of 
an emphasis on neutrality in the national and international mediations standards discussed 
previously). 
716 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:695 
A. The Role of Culture in Mediation: Individualist vs. Collectivist 
Cultures 
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization defines culture as “the whole complex of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that 
characterize a society or social group . . . includ(ing) not only the arts 
and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the 
human being, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.”122 Culture is a 
lens through which we see the world that can influence our choices 
and shape how we view the choices of others.123 
There are several “poles” along which cultures tend to divide, 
and which can explain how culture plays a role in mediation.124 One 
pole is a culture’s sense of identity, which divides between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures.125 Typically, negotiators 
from individualistic cultures feel less attached to social groups and are 
more likely to focus on personal goals and preferences.126 
                                                            
122.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 306; UNESCO, Mexico City 
Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, 1 (July 26 – Aug. 6, 
1982), http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/12762/11295421661mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en
.pdf (“The Conference agrees: that in its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole 
complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a 
society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the 
fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”).  
123.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Clearly culture today 
encompasses all those habits of action and thought that link us to the larger communities 
around us. Thus, culture is not simply what we do; it is the lens through which we see the 
world. It not only primes our choices but shapes how we view the choices of others.”); Rivers, 
supra note 4, at 4 (“Cultural differences create ethical dilemmas between negotiators because 
negotiators from diverse cultures perceive certain behaviors as either acceptable or 
unacceptable.”). 
124.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“If disputants bring to the 
mediation table dramatically differing expectations of how individuals fit into group 
hierarchies and communicate within and between them, mediation becomes more of a 
challenge. Often stylistic differences require the mediator to constantly explain, reinterpret, 
and reframe. In some situations, the parties’ norms will be so different from both the 
mediator’s and each other’s that helping forge agreement will prove ethically problematic.”); 
see also Rivers, supra note 4, at 3-4.  
125. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Rivers, supra note 4, at 3 
(“The most common operationalization of culture in negotiation ethics research has been the 
‘culture as shared values’ approach, where culture is broken down into one or more cultural 
value dimensions, such as individualism vs. collectivism.”). 
126. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Rivers, supra note 4, at 12 
(“One view is that individualists are interested in themselves, so therefore they are more likely 
to act in a way that supports individual achievement and be less concerned for others . . . 
members of individualistic cultures would find deceptive behavior that promotes self-interest 
as more acceptable than would members of collectivist cultures.”). 
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Individualists tend to focus on who gets how much and when.127 They 
emphasize the rights and needs of the individual, including self-
reliance, freedom and individual achievement.128  
Collectivist cultures are more interdependent and are bound by a 
large web of social relations and obligations, and collectivist 
negotiators apply these values to their practices.129 Collectivists place 
great emphasis on relationship building in negotiations and are 
concerned about how their decisions will affect goodwill, sympathy, 
and trust between the parties.130 Collectivists are more concerned with 
family, organizations, and community.131 
To illustrate the different nature of individualist and collectivist 
negotiators, the example of a sale between these two parties offers a 
helpful illustration of differences.132 We may assume that the 
individualist will begin the encounter by “getting down to 
business.”133 She will not be shy about expressing what she needs to 
complete the sale and she will aim to complete the deal in a 
memorialized document that includes terms and contingencies of the 
                                                            
127. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at 1 
(“Individualism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the 
individual . . . When establishing the level of their commitment to others, individualists 
balance the advantages and disadvantages of cultivating and maintaining a relationship; the 
level of commitment generally corresponds to the level of perceived benefit. Personal 
preferences, needs, rights and goals are individualists’ primary concerns, and they tend to 
place a high value on personal freedom and achievement. Self-reliance and competitiveness 
are common individualist traits.”). 
128.  Roger J. Volkema & Maria Fleury, Alternative Negotiating Conditions and the 
Choice of Negotiation Tactics: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 36 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 381, 384 
(2002); Wright, supra note 4, at 1 (“Individualists view themselves as independent and only 
loosely connected to the groups of which they are a part.”). 
129. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at 1-
2 (“Collectivism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the group. 
Collectivists view themselves as interdependent and closely linked to one or more groups. 
They often are willing to maintain a commitment to a group even when their obligations to the 
group are personally disadvantageous. Norms, obligations and duties to groups are 
collectivists’ primary concerns, and they tend to place a high value on group harmony and 
solidarity. Respectfulness and cooperation are common collectivist traits. When personal goals 
conflict with group norms, collectivists tend to conform to group norms.”). 
130.  See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at 
1-2 (emphasizing what is important to collectivist cultures). 
131. See Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 384; see Wright, supra note 4, at 1-2 
(highlighting sociological theory and findings on collectivist cultures). 
132.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (summarizing an example of how individualist and collectivists cultures behave while 
negotiating with each other). 
133.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (explaining the way an individualist typically will approach a transaction). 
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sale.134 By contrast, the collectivist buyer would most likely begin 
with small talk and perhaps do something social with the individualist 
party, like have a meal together, before getting to the transaction.135 
The collectivist buyer will most likely be uncomfortable with the 
individualist’s bluntness and shy away from her direct requests.136 
The buyer will also frequently check back with his associates to make 
sure his instincts are in sync with theirs.137 
Dutch psychologist Geert Hofstede surveyed cultural difference 
in over 50 countries and found that individualists are predominately 
found in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, 
South Africa, and most of the countries in Northern and Western 
Europe, while collectivists are predominant in most of the rest of the 
world.138 The Hofstede study also found that the United States was 
the most individualist country surveyed.139  
As shown in the previous example of a sale between 
individualist and collectivist parties, these two groups differ in several 
ways that affect their negotiation and mediation styles.140 One 
significant difference between these cultures is their contrasting views 
of the nature of conflict.141 Individualists usually view conflict as a 
                                                            
134.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (highlighting the typicality of individualists to share their bottom line upfront and 
memorialize their negotiations). 
135.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (describing the typical behaviors of a collectivist when approaching a negotiation). 
136.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (explaining a collectivists rejection of “abrasive” individualist behaviors). 
137.  Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4, 
at 4-10 (exemplifying the communal tendencies of collectivists). 
138. Wright, supra note 4, at 2-3; Malcom Sher, Recognizing and Validating Diversity in 
Mediation, MEDIATE (Aug. 2008), http://www.mediate.com/articles/sherM2.cfm (“Hofstede . . 
. labels Americans, people from Israel, South Africa and many of the countries of Northern 
and Western Europe as ‘individualists,’ whose social pattern Hofstede contends emphasizes 
their personal preferences, goals, rights, needs, and interests which tend to be self-reliant and 
competitive. Conversely, ‘collectivists’ predominate in much of the rest of Africa and the 
Middle East, most of Asia, South America, Mexico and parts of Eastern Europe. Often less 
affluent, they may be more focused on achieving group harmony and solidarity based on a 
sense of communal duty and responsibility.”). 
139. Wright, supra note 4, at 3 (stating Hofstede’s finding about the United States). 
140. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text (referencing the previously 
discussed example of a transaction between an individualist and a collectivist). 
141. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Mohammad N. Elahee, Susan L. Kirby & Ercan Nasif, 
National Culture, Trust, and Perceptions About Ethical Behavior in Intra- and Cross-Cultural 
Negotiations: An Analysis of NAFTA Countries, 44(6) THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 799, 
805 (Nov.-Dec. 2002) (“Individualistic cultures nurture equality, individual freedom, self-
expression, and personal achievement. In an individualistic culture, affiliation with a group is a 
matter of choice, not compulsion. Finally, because of the popularity of an adversarial approach 
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natural phenomenon of human interaction while collectivists view 
conflict as an aberration, thus avoidance is a common, and often 
preferred, approach to conflict for collectivists.142 
These differing views on conflict affect the parties’ decisions to 
participate in mediations.143 Individualists are usually able to 
acknowledge conflict and participate in mediation without feeling 
shame because they view conflict as natural.144 Contrastingly, for 
collectivists an acknowledgement of conflict can be considered a 
“loss of face” and participation in a mediation is unwelcomed.145 
These differences are also reflected in the type of mediator 
individualists and collectivists prefer and what they expect from a 
mediator.146 Individualists usually prefer professional mediators with 
specialized training and expect them to be impartial with no 
undisclosed relationship to a party in the dispute.147 Collectivists 
prefer that the mediator be an insider who knows the parties or the 
context of their disputes, and are less concerned with professional 
credentials and impartiality.148  
                                                                                                                                     
in education, business, and politics, presentation of arguments in a logical and persuasive 
manner is accepted and admired. On the other hand, in a collectivist society, roles are ascribed, 
and one’s primary relationships and loyalties are inherited, in-group, and often lifelong. 
Conflict is resolved not by challenging the status quo, but by showing concern for continuing 
harmony, peace, and continuity, as opposed to any abstract notion of justice or fairness. The 
individualism/collectivism construct has been shown to affect work values, cognition, 
communication, conflict resolution, and the distributive behavior of people.”). 
142. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (acknowledging 
individualist comfort and collectivist discomfort with conflict). 
143. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (introducing 
individualist and collectivist attitudes toward entering mediations). 
144. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (acknowledging why 
individualists are willing to come to the table and participate in mediations). 
145. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (explaining why 
collectivists are less willing to participate in mediations). 
146. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see also Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 
307-13 (introducing the mediator preferences of individualist and collectivist cultures). 
147. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310 
(“The seller from the individualist culture . . . will be inclined to want to begin the encounter 
by getting down to business. She will not be shy in saying what she needs to complete this 
sale, and she will be aiming to memorialize the deal in a detailed document that considers all 
contingencies and explicitly provide for remedies if the buyer fails to perform.”). 
148. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 
(“Negotiators in collectivist cultures view themselves as more interdependent and bound by a 
larger web of social relations and obligations. They place greater emphasis on the relationship 
building aspect of negotiations. Decisions to compromise, hold fast, agree, object, or explain 
are all made with an eye to how decisions will affect goodwill, sympathy, and trust between 
the parties.”). 
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Differing perspectives can lead to confusion between 
collectivists and individualists with regard to ethics in mediation.149 
When a party foreign to the other party in the mediation, either 
individualist or collectivist, breaches ethical expectations, they often 
elicit negative emotions from the other party who leaves the 
mediation appalled, unhappy, angered, and frustrated.150 These 
emotions inhibit the cultivation of trust that helps achieve settlements 
in negotiations and mediations.151  
Walter Wright cultivated suggestions for individualist and 
collectivist mediators when dealing with cultural differences between 
each other.152 He explains that if US mediators detect resistance to 
participate in mediation from people exhibiting collectivist behavior, 
the mediator should offer modifications to their mediation formats.153 
If specialized knowledge of the disputant’s social context seems to be 
useful, the mediator should consider referring the matter to another 
mediator with that knowledge and asking him to serve as a co-
mediator.154 To avoid conflicting expectations among the mediators 
and negotiating parties, the mediator should voice what he considers 
to be proper mediator roles and have the parties understand and agree 
                                                            
149. Wright, supra note 4; Rivers, supra note 4, at 1 (“It is posited that culture directly 
influences the legal environment, organizational code of ethics, organizational goals, and the 
perception of the other party, and that culture moderates negotiators’ understanding of each of 
these situational variables.”). 
150. Rivers, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311 
(“Differences in how buyer and seller approach language, relate to status differentials, identify 
as embedded in relational networks, and experience time may breed confusion and turmoil.”). 
151. Rivers, supra note 4, at 1; see also Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 
307-13; Wright, supra note 9, at 3-4 (explaining how distrust affects the likelihood of 
resolution). 
152. See Wright, supra note 4, at 4-7 (introducing suggestions for cross cultural 
mediations); Rivers, supra note 4, at 15-19; INT’L MEDIATION INST., WALTER WRIGHT’S 
CURRENT POSITION AND BACKGROUND, https://imimediation.org/walter-wright (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2016) (“Walter (Wright) has a strong record of service to the ADR profession. He is 
former president of the Texas Association of Mediators and the Association of Attorney-
Mediators. For six years, he was Chair of the Newsletter Editorial Board of Alternative 
Resolutions, the newsletter of the ADR Section of the State Bar of Texas. He has received 
several awards for service, including the Steve Brutsché Award from the Association of 
Attorney-Mediators (2005), the Frank G. Evans Award from the ADR Section of the State Bar 
of Texas (2008), and the Susanne Adams Award from the Texas Association of Mediators 
(2009).”).  
153. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see Rivers, supra note 4, at 17-18 (explaining how a 
mediator can try to accommodate his conduct to cultural preferences). 
154. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 308-
13 (suggesting when a mediator should withdraw or step down in a mediation). 
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to those roles.155 If agreement on these roles cannot be met it may be 
best to allow the parties to either find another mediator or to choose a 
different dispute resolution process.156 
B. Ethical Behavior in Mediation 
Ethics are the rules, standards, codes, or principles providing 
guidelines for morally right behavior and truthfulness in specific 
situations.157 The term ‟ambiguous,” meanwhile, is defined as 
doubtful, questionable, and open to several possible interpretations.158 
When behavior is ethically ambiguous there are multiple 
understandings of whether it conforms to standards of what is right or 
wrong.159 Policies, procedures, and rules are often considered 
mechanisms for controlling ambiguity and uncertainty.160 
Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (“EANTs”) are 
maneuvers during a negotiation that at least some participants or 
observers may regard as wrong or as unacceptable behavior according 
to their cultural and ethical standards and expectations.161 Some 
examples of EANTs are the promise to reward the other party at some 
future date, even if there is no intent to follow through on the 
                                                            
155. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 308-
13 (suggesting that the mediator find commonalities between the parties with regard to 
mediator conduct). 
156. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 
(explaining when a mediator should let go of the mediation allow the mediating parties to 
decide where the dispute shall go). 
157. Rivers, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Lewis, Defining Business Ethics: Like Nailing 
Jello to a Wall, 4(5) J. OF BUS. ETHICS (1985)); Roger J. Volkema, Demographic, Cultural 
and Economic Predictors of Perceived Ethicality of Negotiation Behavior: A Nine-Country 
Analysis, 57 J. OF BUS. RESEARCH 69, 69 (2004) (“Ethics refers to the moral principles, 
values, and rules that govern a group of people.”). 
158. Ambiguous, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“doubtful, questionable, 
and open to several possible interpretations”); Ambiguous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
(2014) (“capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways”).  
159. Rivers, supra note 4, at 4; Volkema, supra note 157, at 69 (“By differentiating the 
effects of these constructs on ethical attitudes and behavior, researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners can better understand regional differences in the use of negotiating 
tactics/behaviors, how attitudes towards those tactics or behaviors might change over time, and 
the relative effectiveness of a universal code of ethics on different populations.”). 
160. Volkema, supra note 157, at 70; Rivers, supra note 4, at 1-2 (methods of 
controlling ambiguity).  
161. Rivers, supra note 4, at 5; Volkema, supra note 157, at 70 (“Culture impacts the 
individuals in a negotiation (their stereotypes, intentions, values), the structural components of 
a negotiation (e.g., the number of representatives sent to negotiate, the decision-making 
approach), the strategy employed (e.g., direct or indirect engagement), and the process 
(bluffing, threats, etc.).”). 
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promise, and providing statistical misinformation that supports the 
party’s case.162 Considering that individuals will vary in their ethical 
behaviors based on situational contingencies, perceived ethicality and 
the likely use of EANTs have been measured under eight conditions: 
1) unspecified context; 2) where the opponent has a reputation as an 
unethical negotiator; 3) where the country is known for skilled 
negotiators; 4) where it is a very important negotiation; 5) where there 
is a time deadline; 6) where the opponent has a reputation as a very 
good negotiator; 7) where there will be future business relations with 
the opponent; and 8) where colleagues will learn negotiation 
details.163 
Findings from a comparative study between the United States 
(individualist) and Mexico (collectivist) support the theory that 
individualists are more approving of EANTs than collectivists.164 For 
high-priority negotiations scholars have shown that negotiators from 
the United States were more likely to use some EANTs.165 Scholars 
have also pointed out that when collectivist negotiators pursue 
relationship goals they view EANTs as a threat to their relationship 
with the other party.166 
There are alternative studies that support the perspective that 
collectivists are more approving of EANTs than individualists.167 In 
these studies, collectivist Mexican participants scored higher than 
individualists from Canada and the United States in their likelihood to 
use EANTs.168 Individualist US negotiators were also less likely to 
                                                            
162.  Rivers, supra note 4, at 5; Volkema, supra note 157, at 70  (providing examples of 
EANTs). 
163. Rivers, supra note 4, at 14; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 381-98 
(listing conditions for the likely use of EANTs). 
164. Rivers, supra note 4, at 12; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799 (“Based 
on survey data collected from businesspeople from Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 
this article shows that trust is culturally embedded and has a negative relationship with the 
likelihood of using certain questionable negotiation tactics. The study found that Mexican 
negotiators are less likely to use questionable negotiation tactics in intracultural negotiations as 
compared to cross-cultural negotiations.”). 
165. Rivers supra note 4, at 17; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799 
(acknowledging US or individualist comfort with EANTs and conflict). 
166. Rivers supra note 4, at 17; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799; Menkel-
Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 148 (acknowledging collectivist discomfort with 
EANTs and conflict). 
167. Rivers supra note 4, at 13; see Roger J. Volkema, A Comparison of Perceptions of 
Ethical Negotiation Behavior in Mexico and the United States, 9(3) INT’L J. OF CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 218, 218-33 (1998) (introducing different theory about EANTs). 
168. Rivers, supra note 4, at 13 (“Supporting the ‘collectivists are more approving of 
EANTs than individualists’ perspective are the results of three studies. Collectivists 
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agree with misrepresentation and bluffing EANTs than collectivist 
Brazilian negotiators.169  
US negotiators under time pressure tend to become competitive 
and have shown to be influenced by deadlines.170 There is a divide 
between long-term cultures, which are usually collectivist cultures 
that have long-range goals focused on achieving longstanding results, 
and short-term cultures, which are usually individualist cultures like 
the United States with temporary goals.171 The organization that 
belongs to long-term cultures typically has long-range goals and does 
not set strict deadlines.172 But, organization from a short-term culture 
will usually have a hard deadline set for their goals in a negotiation or 
mediation.173 
The tactics that individualists and collectivists use in their 
negotiations reflect their expectations of mediators.174 Wright 
suggests that in order to avoid conflicting expectations among 
mediators and the disputing parties, a mediator should disclose her 
                                                                                                                                     
(Mexicans) scored higher than individualists (Canada and the U.S.) in their likelihood to use 
EANTs.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167. 
169. Rivers, supra note 4, at 13 (“U.S. negotiators (individualists) were less likely to 
endorse misrepresentation and bluffing EANTs than Brazilian negotiators (collectivists). In a 
vast eight country study, Triandis et al. (2001) argued and found that vertical collectivists were 
more likely to lie in a negotiation situation than horizontal individualists, because the 
collectivists have a greater distance between themselves and the other party.”); see also 
Volkema, supra note 167. 
170. Rivers, supra note 4, at 18 (“Deadlines were included in Gelfand and Dyer’s (2000) 
model, and they argue that there may be cultural differences in how time pressure influences 
negotiation schemas. They give the example that a U.S. negotiator under time pressure might 
become more competitive, whereas a Scandinavian negotiator under time pressure might 
become more cooperative. U.S. negotiators have indeed been measured to be influenced by 
deadlines - when told there is a deadline, their ratings of likelihood of use of the EANT 
‘promise good things will happen’ is significantly higher than in an unspecified negotiation 
situation.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167. 
171.  Rivers, supra note 4, at 18 (“There are cultural differences in how time pressure 
influences the use or perceived appropriateness of EANTs and that this area warrants further 
investigation. Whether or not deadlines are imposed is also likely to differ across cultures. 
Organizations that belong to long-term cultures (e.g. China or Taiwan) (Chinese Cultural 
Connection 1987) often have long-range goals and may not set strict deadlines, while an 
organization from a short-term culture like the U.S. will probably have a definite deadline to 
achieve its goals.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167. 
172. Supra note 171 and accompanying text (summarizing the organization of long-term 
cultures). 
173. Supra note 171 and accompanying text (summarizing the organization of short-term 
cultures). 
174. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311 
(referencing the previously discussed expectations that individualists and collectivists have of 
mediators). 
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perceptions of proper mediator roles and attempt to ensure that the 
disputants’ understand and agree to those roles.175 If an agreement on 
these basic matters cannot be secured, it may be best to find another 
mediator or choose another dispute resolution process.176 If disputing 
parties can understand why there are different ethical expectations 
across cultures, they can have fewer feelings of anger and mistrust 
elicited by the use of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics, and also 
avoid the use of tactics that might hinder resolution between the 
parties.177 
The following subsection describes Mitchell’s experience 
mediating between countries with differing cultural perceptions and 
Brahimi’s experience mediating a conflict between parties from the 
same country but with vastly different political opinions. The tension 
and lack of compromise between the parties of their mediations led 
Mitchell to withdraw from mediating the Israel-Palestine conflict and 
Brahimi to withdraw from mediating the dispute in Syria. Mitchell 
and Brahimi’s experiences reflect on the issues previously discussed 
about ethical and cultural expectations of certain countries and 
cultures and how these expectations influence the perception of a 
mediator based on his nationality and perceived cultural, political, and 
ethical perspective and preference.  
C. The Mediations of George Mitchell and Lakhdar Brahimi 
i. George Mitchell 
George Mitchell is a coveted mediator, appointed as Special 
Envoy for Northern Ireland by United States President Bill Clinton in 
1995 and Special Envoy to the Middle East by United States 
President Barack Obama in 2009.178 Mitchell succeeded in Ireland by 
                                                            
175. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311 
(suggestions to avoid conflicting expectations of individualists and collectivists with regard to 
mediator conduct). 
176. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311 
(discussing mediator withdrawal). 
177. Rivers, supra note 4, at 2; see Morris & Fu, supra note 37 (discussing how cultural 
open-mindedness and education can lead to resolutions in mediations). 
178. George Mitchell Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/09/19/us/george-mitchell-fast-facts/; Nicholas Watt, George Mitchell’s patient 
diplomacy shepherded Northern Ireland to peace. Now for the Middle East . . . , GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2009/jan/23/george-mitchell-
interview (“George Mitchell . . . who has been appointed by Barack Obama as his Middle East 
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facilitating a resolution and drafting the Good Friday Agreement, but 
failed in Israel-Palestine, withdrawing after two years without a 
resolution.179  
a. Mitchell’s Role in Resolving “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland 
The 30-year conflict in Ireland referred to as “The Troubles” 
began in 1968 and ended in 1998 with the drafting of the Good Friday 
Agreement.180 The constitutional status of Northern Ireland was at the 
heart of the conflict, which the unionist, nationalist, and republican 
parties in Ireland quarreled over.181 The unionists, who were mostly 
Protestant and formed the majority in this conflict, wanted Northern 
Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.182 The nationalists and 
republicans, mostly Catholics who were the minority, wanted 
Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland.183 
The road to resolution for this conflict was paved with many 
deaths, violence, and political turmoil that were eventually overcome 
through peaceful democratic means.184 Cross-party talks began in 
1996, with the help of President Clinton and Mitchell, which 
concluded with the Good Friday Agreement.185 This agreement 
created a government body comprised of both Catholics and 
Protestants, called for disarmament, released jailed combatants, 
reorganized the police force, which was ninety-three percent 
Protestant at the time, and also stipulated that Northern Ireland remain 
part of Britain.186  
                                                                                                                                     
peace envoy – spent years working painstakingly to shepherd the Northern Ireland peace 
process.”). 
179.  See infra notes 180-212 and 214-64 and accompanying text (summarizing 
Mitchell’s outcomes mediating in Northern Ireland and Israel Palestine). 
180. See generally Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2009), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northern-
ireland-getting-past-the-troubles-52862004/ (introducing the timeline of the start and 
resolution of “the Troubles”); The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 
1968-1998, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
181. See The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland, supra note 180 
(identifying the parties of the dispute in Northern Ireland). 
182. See id. (explaining the goals and expectations of the unionist party).  
183. See id. (explaining the goals and expectations of the nationalists and republicans). 
184. See id. (summarizing the hardships of the Troubles). 
185. See id. (introducing President Clinton’s and Mitchell’s role in the mediation process 
in Northern Ireland). 
186. See Hammer, supra note 180 (summarizing the Good Friday Agreement). 
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When Mitchell was appointed as Special Envoy in Northern 
Ireland, it was debatable whether the Irish welcomed him.187 British 
newspaper The Independent reported that “when former US Senator 
George Mitchell was first mentioned as a possible chairman for the 
Northern Ireland peace talks, David Trimble’s party denounced the 
idea as ‘the equivalent of an American Serb presiding over talks on 
the future of Croatia.’”188 This newspaper also reported that Ian 
Paisley’s party categorized Mitchell as “a Catholic Irish-American 
from the same stable as the Kennedys.”189  
In his book Making Peace, Mitchell recollects walking into a 
conference chamber for his first encounter with Reverend Ian Paisley, 
who had objected to his chairmanship:  
When I entered the room and walked toward my seat my 
attention was drawn to the DUP section by a noisy 
commotion.190 There, Dr. Paisley was standing and saying, in a 
loud voice, “No. No. No. No.”191 He repeated it over and over 
again, until I was in my seat.192  
 I was extremely uncomfortable. . . .193  
 Although I had read and heard a lot about Paisley and his 
tactics, this was my first direct exposure to them, and it was 
                                                            
187. See The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland, supra note 180 
(introducing negative commentary on Mitchell’s presence as a mediator in Ireland during the 
Troubles); see also infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.   
188. David McKittrick, Profile: George Mitchell – The Man to Bring Peace to Ulster?, 
INDEPENDENT (July 18, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/profile-george-mitchell--
the-man-to-bring-peace-to-ulster-1107249.html; see James G. Driscoll, Optimist George 
Mitchell Believes Northern Ireland Can Achieve Peace, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 1996), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-02-18/news/9602180123_1_northern-ireland-sen-george-
mitchell-ira-cease-fire (“The American, former Sen. George Mitchell, and his two colleagues 
made public their recommendations on Jan. 24, urging all-party talks while, simultaneously, 
some arms could be given up. The report was received well by some, but churlishly by others, 
among them the myopic John Major of Britain. Sixteen days later, the Irish Republican Army 
gave its response. A murderous one, it was, ripping apart a London building, killing two news 
vendors and making Mitchell feel exceedingly bad. The distrustful mind-set not only persists, 
but dismisses the fervent wish for peace among so many in the six northern counties.”). 
189. See McKittrick, supra note 188 (acknowledging skepticism of Mitchell and his 
background). 
190. GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE 50 (1999). 
191. Id. (Mitchell’s recollection of Ian Paisley’s rejection of his presence). 
192. Id. (emphasizing Paisley’s rejection of Mitchell). 
193. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his own discomfort). 
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shocking.194 I was accustomed to rough-and-tumble political 
debate, but I’d never experienced anything like this.195  
These negative views of Mitchell could have compromised the 
public’s opinion of his neutrality in the mediations he conducted in 
Northern Ireland.196 The Irish and Northern Irish opinions of the 
neutrality of the United States in this matter, however, soon improved 
and the region began to embrace President Clinton and Mitchell.197 
David McKittrick from The Independent expresses Mitchell’s 
acceptance in Northern Ireland, saying:  
From the minute he first became involved in Northern Ireland in 
early 1995, then in the role of Bill Clinton’s economic envoy, his 
American “can do” manner generated both optimism and interest. 
His style was not that of brash and impatient hubris. Instead, it 
was obvious from the word go that this was a mature and 
seasoned statesman, a major player with abilities far in excess of 
those normally seen in Northern Ireland. In the years that 
followed it was often embarrassing to watch the mismatch 
between his consummate skills and some of Belfast’s political 
pygmies. 198  
These positive views of Mitchell helped him gain acceptance in 
Northern Ireland and also may have contributed to his success 
                                                            
194. Id. (Mitchell pointing out how he had researched the tactics of a party to his 
mediation and what it was like experiencing the party’s behavior in person). 
195. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his unfamiliarity and discomfort with Paisley’s 
behavior). 
196. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (concluding the negative 
commentary about Mitchell’s attempts to mediate in Northern Ireland). 
197. See McKittrick, supra note 188 (“Bill Clinton, once reviled for giving a US visa to 
Gerry Adams, is now viewed in Belfast as being much more evenhanded, and has been 
cheered by both Catholics and Protestants on his visits to Northern Ireland. . . . George 
Mitchell is a sign of this new approach, the hours he has spent listening to Belfast politicians 
serving as a symbol of the new recognition of the complexities of the problem.”); Richard L. 
Berke, George Mitchell: Gray Eminence in U.S., Bright Star for Irish, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 
1998), http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/050698ireland-mitchell.html (“To the public, 
Mitchell comes off as a politician who cannot be bought. . . . ‘With Clinton, it’s all for votes in 
the Irish community in America,’ said Paul Browne, 23, who works for a computer company 
in Dublin. ‘George Mitchell actually cared. He wasn’t paid for what he did.’”). 
198. McKittrick, supra note 188; see Berke, supra note 197 (“Mitchell conceded that the 
affection here [in Ireland] was far different from anything he had experienced back home. The 
reason, he said, is that people here have yearned for decades for peace. He said his popularity 
may also be born of comfort; he has been traveling here regularly now for nearly three years, 
so he has become a familiar face, and people trust him.”).  
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there.199 This positivity likely contributed to his ability to execute the 
Good Friday Agreement because he gained the trust of many Irish and 
Northern Irish people and gave the impression that he was neutral and 
unbiased in the dispute.200 
During Mitchell’s time in Ireland, there were certain aspects of 
his mediation strategies that were successful during the talks he 
conducted at Stormont, the Northern Ireland Parliament, in brokering 
the Good Friday Agreement.201 First, Mitchell made a conflict 
assessment by meeting with all of the stakeholders involved from 
November 1995 through January 1996 as part of the three-man 
International Commission on Decommissioning.202 Mitchell’s effort 
to include all relevant parties in his peacemaking process was a 
practical method to gain the trust and confidence of the people of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland.203 As previously discussed, inclusivity 
is acknowledged in the UN Guidance and by using this mediation 
method Mitchell legitimized his peacemaking methods in Northern 
Ireland and reduced the likelihood of excluded parties undermining 
                                                            
199. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (summarizing the positive 
commentary on Mitchell’s role as mediator in Northern Ireland). 
200. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the trust Mitchell 
gained from the mediating parties likely contributed to a resolution, the Good Friday 
Agreement). 
201. See Geoffrey Corry, George Mitchell: Role Model for Mediation, MEDIATE.COM, 
http://www.mediate.com/articles/corry.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). See generally Daniel 
Curran & James K. Sebenius, The Mediator as Coalition Builder: George Mitchell in Northern 
Ireland, 8 INT’L NEGOT. 111, 125-43 (2003) (introducing Mitchell’s successful mediation 
tactics). 
202. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 134 (“Both the U.K. and the Unionist 
parties had long insisted on decommissioning weapons as an absolute precondition for any 
talks; Margaret Thatcher, in particular, had been unyielding. Yet without active participation 
of a broad swath of the Catholic Republicans, a coalition of the center would be impossible. 
Thus Mitchell needed to keep the unionists in the talks by giving them enough reassurance on 
this core issue. . . . By July 1997, when it became apparent that the issue was still a stumbling 
block, Mitchell proposed that the issue of decommissioning be moved from the All-Party talks 
to an International Commission on Decommissioning. In August 1997, he created a Liaison 
Subcommittee on Decommissioning between the All-Party talks and the new Commission. This 
assured the unionists that the issue was still very much alive but not an impediment to further 
talks.”); Corry, supra note 201.  
203.  See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 129-30; Corry, supra note 201; UN 
Guidance, supra note 83, at 11-13 (emphasizing the trust building gains of inclusivity in a 
mediation process).  
2016] DOES NATIONALITY INFLUENCE NEUTRALITY? 729 
his progress.204 Inclusivity also increases the legitimacy and national 
ownership of the peace agreement and its implementation.205  
Second, Mitchell set out what became known as the “Mitchell 
Principles,” a set of six anti-violence statements that provided an 
avenue into all-party talks that were pivotal to the negotiation 
process.206 Mitchell proposed that a commitment to democratic and 
peaceful methods in resolving issues should be the test for 
participation in the talks because this would show a willingness to 
create progress and common ground between the parties.207 By setting 
up the “Mitchell Principles,” he established parameters for these 
parties to engage in effective mediations.208 Mitchell was able to get 
the parties’ productive cooperation in this mediation without ethical 
ambiguity or confusion by having the parties agree upon a standard 
for how to conduct the mediation, which led to a positive result.209 
Third, he made a deadline of April 9, 1998, the day before Good 
Friday, which helped the parties make difficult decisions in a timely 
manner and prevented the negotiations from going on forever.210 The 
mediation tactic of setting a deadline is frequently used by people 
from the United States and individualist cultures.211 Mitchell’s use of 
                                                            
204.  See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 127; Corry, supra note 201; UN 
Guidance, supra note 83, at 11-13 (discussing the part of the UN Guidance that addresses 
inclusivity).  
205. See UN Guidance, supra note 83, at 11 (discussing the UN Guidance section for 
inclusivity). 
206. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (“The precondition to participate in 
talks required that parties adhere to the ‘Mitchell Principles,’ essential commitments to 
democracy, dialogue, and non-violence. The violations of these principles were the very means 
by which extremist parties would later be excluded from the talks. While banal at one level, 
discussion of adherence to these principles consistently provided procedural common ground, 
and, more importantly, a set of criteria that would later bind members of a coalition of the 
center and distinguish them from their more extreme counterparts.”); Corry, supra note 201.  
207. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (highlighting Mitchell’s emphasis 
on the use of democratic and peaceful methods); Corry, supra note 201. 
208. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128; Corry, supra note 201; infra notes 
331-32 and accompanying text (commenting on the effectiveness of Mitchell’s standards).  
209. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (explaining how this tactic of 
establishing standards yielded positive results for Mitchell’s meditation); Corry, supra note 
201.  
210. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 136 (“Mitchell, in effect, committed 
both to a near-infinitely patient approach followed by a powerfully engineered and daring 
deadline. The deadline served its traditional action-forcing function. Furthermore, it was 
created in a manner that was directly responsive to Mitchell’s lack of formal powers, an 
ongoing and significant barrier.”); Corry, supra note 201. 
211. See Rivers, supra note 170, at 18; Wright, supra note 4, at 6 (referring back to 
individualist behavioral statistics).  
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a deadline was met with cooperation in Northern Ireland probably 
because Ireland and Northern Ireland are individualist cultures that 
were more receptive to these tactics.212 
Fourth, Mitchell brought the various parts of the negotiations 
together into a document to serve as a draft treaty.213 The 
memorializing of the resolution reflected Mitchell’s inherently 
individualist logic of trying to get down to business and put it in 
writing to reassure its legitimacy.214 Last, Mitchell implemented an 
inclusive process involving the Ulster Democratic Party (“UDP”) and 
the Progressive Unionist Party (“PUP”) for the loyalists, and Sinn 
Fein for the republicans, in which he created an inter-party dialogue 
and a joint thinking and problem solving process.215 Ultimately, 
Mitchell’s methods of inclusivity, established standards for the 
mediation, and deadlines were met with cooperation in Northern 
Ireland and led to the resolution, the Good Friday Agreement.216  
After the Good Friday Agreement was made, Mitchell was 
praised for his efforts in the mediation.217 In 1998 he received an 
honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II for his role in this 
agreement.218 On March 17, 1999 he was awarded the Presidential 
                                                            
212. See Wright, supra note 4, at 3; supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text 
(acknowledging the differing comfort levels of individualists and collectivists with setting 
deadlines).  
213. See Wright, supra note 4, at 6 (“Individualists tend to be autonomous decision 
makers. As such, they are more concerned with how an option affects them than with how it 
affects others. In a successful mediation, issues are resolved, usually one at a time, and a 
settlement is documented in a written agreement.”); Corry, supra note 201. 
214. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (referring back to the example of an 
individualist seller creating a deal); Corry, supra note 201.  
215. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 127 (“Mitchell pursued a process 
strategy that stressed and modeled the principles of ‘inclusion,’ ‘legitimacy,’ and ‘consent.’ In 
many ways—and yet in line with these principles—he took steps that first expanded and then 
reduced the number of parties involved in the talks to those players that were, at least arguably, 
capable of functioning in a relatively centrist coalition.”); Corry, supra note 201.  
216. See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text (summarizing the successful 
methods of Mitchell’s mediation in Northern Ireland).  
217. See infra note 218-20 and accompanying text (summarizing the praise Mitchell 
received for his success in Northern Ireland). 
218. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; Alex Altman, Middle East Envoy 
George Mitchell, TIME (Jan. 22, 2009) (“In 1998, Mitchell earned an honorary knighthood for 
his role in fostering the peace.”). 
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Medal of Freedom.219 In April 1999, he was also awarded the 
UNESCO Peace Prize.220 
b. Mitchell as the United States’ Middle East Envoy in Israel-
Palestine 
The dispute between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is over 
the ownership of the regions that were divided into Israel, Gaza and 
the West Bank after the Arab-Israeli War of 1947-1948.221 Many 
Israelis argue their claim to the region is based on a divine promise 
from God and a need for a safe haven from European anti-Semitism 
during the 1940’s.222 Palestinians claim that they are the rightful 
inhabitants of this region because their ancestors had been living there 
for centuries.223 
The Oslo Peace Accords, signed in 1993, turned Gaza and the 
West Bank over to the newly created Palestinian Authority, which 
formed one wing of the Palestinian State.224 Hamas, a Palestinian 
Islamic political party, controlled Gaza, and Fatah, a major 
Palestinian political party, ruled the West Bank.225 However, many 
Israeli settlers remained in Gaza.226 In 2005 Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon withdrew all Israeli settlers from Gaza but kept control 
                                                            
219.  Altman, supra note 218 (acknowledging an award Mitchell received for his work 
in Northern Ireland). 
220. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; The Honorable George Mitchell, US-
IRELAND ALLIANCE, http://www.us-irelandalliance.org/content/23/en/The%20Honorable% 
20George%20J.%20Mitchell,%20For%20Whom%20The%20Mitchell%20Scholarship%20Is
%20Named.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (“For his service in Northern Ireland Senator 
Mitchell received numerous awards and honors, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom, 
the highest civilian honor given by the U.S. Government; the Philadelphia Liberty Medal; the 
Truman Institute Peace Prize; and the United Nations (UNESCO) Peace Prize.”). 
221. See The Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, WASHINGTON REPORT ON 
MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, http://www.wrmea.org/the-origins-of-the-israeli-palestinian-
conflict.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); Joel Beinin & Lisa Hajjar, Primer on Palestine, Israel 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, MIDDLE EAST RES. & INFO. PROJECT (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_Palestine-Israel%28MERIP_February2014
%29final.pdf (summarizing the Arab-Israeli dispute). 
222. Beinin & Hajjar, supra note 221, at 1 (explaining the Israeli objectives in this 
conflict). 
223. Id. (explaining the Palestinian objectives in this conflict). 
224. Id. at 9-10 (summarizing the effect of the Oslo Peace Accord on this this conflict 
between Israel and Palestine). 
225. See id. at 8 (introducing Hamas and Fatah). 
226. Id. at 10-11 (pointing out why there was still an issue after the Oslo Peace Accord). 
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over all border crossings and conducted raids, even though this land 
was completely in Palestinian hands at that point.227  
In January 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary 
elections ending the Fatah government’s control.228 In June 2007, 
Fatah moved to carry out a coup to oust Hamas, which was 
unsuccessful, and led to Hamas’ seizure of the Gaza Strip.229 Israel 
later declared that Gaza had become a hostile territory, refused to 
recognize the Hamas government, and tightened its blockade on the 
flow of goods and people in and out of the territories.230 Although in 
2008 Hamas and Israel reached a six-month truce and seemed to be 
moving towards negotiation with regard to this dispute and the 
violence and rocket attacks taking place in Gaza, the conflict 
continued, and Israel continued to occupy Gaza and the West Bank.231  
Mitchell was the Special Envoy to the Middle East from January 
22, 2009 to May 20, 2011.232 He was appointed by United States 
President Obama in January of 2009, and visited Israel and the West 
Bank several times.233 Contact between Israel and the Palestinians 
resumed in May 2009, after a stalemate of nineteen months, in the 
form of indirect “proximity talks” through Mitchell.234 During these 
proximity talks, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and 
Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas were not in the same room, 
and they spoke through Mitchell, making and listening to demands all 
brokered through Mitchell as their third set of ears.235 Mitchell and 
                                                            
227. Id. at 14-15 (explaining the removal of Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip). 
228. Id. at 15 (introducing the conflict between Hamas and Fatah). 
229. Id. (describing the start of the hostilities at the Gaza strip). 
230. Id. (explaining Israeli involvement in Gaza and rejection of Hamas). 
231. See id. at 16 (explaining the continuance of the conflict between Israel and Hamas). 
232. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; Altman, supra note 218 (introducing 
Mitchell’s presence in Israel-Palestine and his role as mediator there). 
233. Steven Lee Myers, Amid Impasse in Peace Negotiations, America’s Chief Middle 
East Envoy Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/ 
world/middleeast/14mitchell.html; Grim Omens as US Envoy Pursues Mideast Relaunch, 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/print/grim-
omens-as-us-envoy-pursues-mideast-relaunch/ (“The missions have been stymied by 
Netanyahu’s refusal to halt settlement construction and by Arab states’ reluctance to make 
peace overtures.”). 
234. See History of Mid-East Peace Talks, BBC (July 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-middle-east-11103745 (“After taking office, US President Barack Obama was 
quick to try to restart the peace process. Contact between Israel and the Palestinians resumed 
in May 2009, after a hiatus of 19 months, in the form of indirect ‘proximity talks’ through US 
Middle East envoy George Mitchell.”). 
235. Sarah Wildman, Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Talks, POL. DAILY (May 15, 2011), 
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/15/envoy-george-mitchell-lays-groundwork-for-israeli-
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President Obama’s goal in these talks was to have the two States 
living side by side in peace and security.236 
President Obama and Mitchell’s mission was stymied by Prime 
Minister Netanyahu’s refusal to stop construction in Gaza and the 
West Bank and Hamas’ hesitance to make peace offers.237 Mitchell 
tried, and later failed, to persuade Israel to freeze construction of 
settlements in territories claimed by the Palestinians.238 President 
Obama’s administration persuaded Chairman Abbas to agree to 
demand a complete settlement freeze as a price for restarting talks.239  
When the freeze didn’t happen, Chairman Abbas was 
embarrassingly stranded and seemed to lack a strategy.240 Doubters in 
his own party and his rivals were calling for his replacement.241 “For 
months we've done nothing,” says a Fatah stalwart who has 
sometimes been touted as a successor.242 “We have no elections, no 
reconciliation with Hamas, and no negotiations.243 We're looking 
ridiculous.”244 
                                                                                                                                     
palestiniantal/; An Inevitably Edgy Start, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/world/middle-east/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16117248 (pointing 
out that the parties to this mediation were not willing to face each other and the methods 
Mitchell employed to accommodate this). 
236. See Myers, supra note 233; Andrea Stone, Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, 
‘Hit a Brick Wall’ on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/13/mideast-envoy-george-mitc_n_861838.html (“In 
announcing Mitchell’s resignation in a statement, Obama called him ‘a tireless advocate for 
peace’ whose ‘deep commitment to resolving conflict and advancing democracy has 
contributed immeasurably to the goal of two states living side by side in peace and security.’”). 
237.  Grim Omens as US Envoy Pursues Mideast Relaunch, supra note 233; Myers, 
supra note 233 (explaining how Netanyahu and Hamas hindered Mitchell and President 
Obama’s mission in Israel-Palestine and progress in this mediation). 
238.  Myers, supra note 233 (explaining Mitchell’s efforts to lessen the tension between 
Israel and Hamas). 
239. The Palestinians and the Peace Process: Will He, Won’t He, Join the Dance?, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
15403099?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e; Grim Omens as US Envoy 
Pursues Mideast Relaunch, supra note 233 (President Obama’s methods to bring Abbas to the 
table to participate in a mediation). 
240. See The Palestinians and the Peace Process, supra note 239 (acknowledging 
Abbas’ vulnerability when the construction freeze did not go through). 
241. Id. (“Doubters in his own party, Fatah, as well as his bitter rivals in Hamas, the 
Islamist Palestinian movement that runs Gaza, are sneering at his failure to make progress and 
are calling for his replacement; indeed, he has already said he would resign.”). 
242. Id. (exemplifying Palestinian frustration with Abbas). 
243. Id. (acknowledging a lack of progress for the Palestinians in this mediation). 
244. Id. (exemplifying the shame felt by Palestinians after the construction freeze did not 
go through). 
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After the freeze did not occur, the lack of progress likely flared 
Palestinian distrust of the neutrality of the United States and 
Mitchell.245 Chairman Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu later 
launched talks in Washington in September of 2010 led by Mitchell, 
lasting three weeks but resulting in no resolution; they also intensified 
mutual acrimony.246 These political constraints caused great difficulty 
for Mitchell to create a reconciliation between the parties, which 
contributed to his decision to resign.247 Mitchell spent the remainder 
of 2010 trying to get the parties back in a room together without 
success.248  
In December of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
announced that the administration would conduct proximity 
negotiations instead of trying to get the parties in a room together and 
between November 2010 and May 2011 Mitchell made only one trip 
to the Israel-Palestine region.249 Mitchell said in his letter of 
resignation that he initially agreed to do what President Obama called 
“the toughest job imaginable” for only two years.250 Mitchell’s 
resignation in May 2011 formalized his growing disengagement and 
frustration with the conflict throughout that year.251 
United States media hypothesized that Mitchell believed that his 
patience would help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.252 
                                                            
245. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text (connecting the negative Palestinian 
commentary to their distrust of Mitchell). 
246. Robert Danin, George Mitchell Resigns: No Israeli-Palestinian Peace Any Time 
Soon, CNN: GLOBAL PUB. SQUARE (May 13, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/ 
2011/05/13/resignation-of-mideast-envoy-george-mitchell/. 
247. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 250-51 and 
accompanying text (connecting the lack of progress during these talks to Mitchell’s decision to 
resign). 
248. See Danin, supra note 246 (“Abbas insisted that only a renewed settlement 
moratorium would reopen talks, and Netanyahu refused to comply.”). 
249. Id. (denoting the use of proximity talks and Mitchell’s growing disinterest in this 
conflict and lack of presence in Israel-Palestine). 
250. Id.; Ewen MacAskill, George Mitchell Resigns as US Middle East Peace Envoy, 
GUARDIAN (May 13, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/13/george-mitchell-
resigns-us-peace-envoy-middle-east.  
251. See Myers, supra note 233; MacAskill, supra note 250 (“Daniel Levy, co-director 
of the Middle East task force at the New America Foundation, said of Mitchell’s resignation: 
‘Either he has advanced a certain approach that has not been taken up or, basically, that the 
chances of negotiation are diminishing by the day and he is not hanging about.”). 
252. US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43023549/ns/politics/t/us-mideast-envoy-george-mitchell-
resigns/#.U26hO8cmz8B; see George Mitchell, U.N. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, 
Press Briefing on the President’s Trilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel 
and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority at the White House Office of the Press 
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Contrastingly, Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher, the former director of the 
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, commented 
on Mitchell’s mediation methods saying, “The Northern Ireland 
method of listen, listen and listen doesn’t work here.”253 This media 
commentary acknowledges that Mitchell’s methods, in which he had 
a positive experience in Northern Ireland, were not working in this 
radically different dispute between two countries and cultures that are 
extremely different from Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the United 
States.254 
Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem, wrote of Mitchell: “He quit because he failed and he failed 
because he received a mission impossible from President Obama.”255 
Aaron David Miller, a former Middle East peace negotiator, opined 
that Mitchell should not be blamed for failing to break the stalemate 
between Israel and Palestine.256 He goes on to say that:  
80 percent of the blame rests with the “inability and 
unwillingness” of Netanyahu [the Prime Minister of Israel] and 
Abbas [The President of Palestine] to bridge the gaps on the key 
issues of settlements, refugees, borders and Jerusalem.257 The 
other 20 percent . . . rests with the Obama administration “that 
decided to come out louder, harder and faster than almost any of 
its predecessors before understanding what the situation was -- 
what it would take to get negotiations going.”258  
These media commentaries also acknowledge that the 
Palestinians were not cooperating with Mitchell’s proximity talks and 
                                                                                                                                     
Secretary (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Briefing-by-US-
Special-Envoy-for-Middle-East-Peace-George-Mitchell (“I want to make a brief personal 
comment. I believe deeply, rising out of my past experience, that just as conflicts are created 
by human beings, they can be ended by human beings, with patience, determination, and 
dedication. Our aim is to achieve a comprehensive peace in the region that will enable Israelis, 
Palestinians, and all of the region's people to share a secure, prosperous, and stable future.”). 
253. US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, supra note 252 (academic commentary 
on how the mediation methods Mitchell used in Ireland don’t work in Israel-Palestine). 
254. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (pointing out that one method does 
not work for every mediation). 
255. Stone, supra note 236; Peace Deal Impossible Now Says Israel Foreign Minister, 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 8, 2009), http://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/print/peace-
deal-impossible-now-says-israel-foreign-minister/ (“Israel’s foreign minister [Avigdor 
Lieberman] says there’s no chance of ending the Israeli- Palestinian conflict for many years.”). 
256. Stone, supra note 236 (providing an opinion that takes the blame off of Mitchell). 
257. Id. (placing part of the blame for lack of progress in the talks between Netanyahu 
and Abbas on the parties themselves). 
258. Id. (placing some of the blame on the Obama Administration). 
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President Obama’s aggressive approach in Israel-Palestine, which 
were inherently individualist.259 These commentaries also bring to 
light the theory that the Obama Administration may not be making 
progress in Israel-Palestine because it lacks an understanding of the 
conflict.260 
The Jewish Daily Forward reported on Mitchell’s resignation:  
 Mitchell tried to remain optimistic regarding the prospects 
for peace in the Middle East, and frequently repeated the story 
about his tenure as peace negotiator for Northern Ireland, where 
he experienced “700 days of failure and one day of success.”261 
But as his 700th day as Middle East envoy passed, frustration 
among Mitchell and his team members was evident and on the 
rise.262 According to activists involved in the process, Mitchell 
expressed this frustration in private talks, and for the past several 
months, observers in Washington speculated that his days as 
special envoy were coming to an end.263  
Mitchell resigned in May 2011 in frustration that may have 
stemmed from the fact that the methods he had used in Northern 
Ireland did not yield the same successful result in Israel-Palestine.264 
This failure could have also resulted from the Palestinian’s lack of 
trust felt towards President Obama and Mitchell and in the neutrality 
of the United States and Mitchell in this conflict.265  
ii. Lakhdar Brahimi as the United Nations’ Special Envoy in Syria 
In August 2012 Lakhdar Brahimi replaced Kofi Annan as the 
United Nations Special Envoy to Syria after the former United 
Nations Secretary-General resigned from the job.266 Brahimi took 
                                                            
259. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 133 and 
accompanying text (exemplifying individualist behavior).  
260. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text (analyzing the previous media 
commentaries and concluding that this mediation may have lacked progress because of the 
mediator’s lack of understanding of the conflict). 
261. Nathan Guttman, Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, Amid Frustration, Turf 
Wars, FORWARD (May 13, 2011), http://forward.com/articles/137797/mideast-envoy-george-
mitchell-resigns-amid-frustra/. 
262. Id. (pointing out Mitchell’s frustration in Israel-Palestine). 
263. Id. (describing Mitchell’s frustrations that led to his resignation). 
264. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (hypothesizing why Mitchell was so 
frustrated with the lack of progress in his mediation in Israel-Palestine). 
265. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that the failure 
experienced in Israel-Palestine could have resulted from Palestinian distrust of the mediator). 
266. Terri Rupar, U.N. Envoy on Syria Lakhdar Brahimi: A Primer, WASH. POST (Jan. 
24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-envoy-on-syria-lakhdar-
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over where Annan left off for the UN-Arab League peace mission, 
also known as the six-point plan for Syria that called for military 
pullback, establishment of ceasefires, and political discourse.267 From 
2012 to 2014, Brahimi contributed to the launch of and mediated in 
the Geneva II Middle East Peace Conference (“Geneva II 
Conference”) to help end the Syrian Civil War, which has contributed 
to over 100,000 deaths and the displacement of over nine million 
people from their homes since the conflict began between the 
government of President Bashar al-Assad and various groups seeking 
to oust that regime.268 The goal of the Geneva II Conference was to 
attain a political solution to the Syrian conflict through an agreement 
between the Syrian government and opposition to implement the 
Geneva Communiqué, which calls for the establishment of a 
transitional government in Syria that would lead to holding 
elections.269 
Although communication between the parties revealed some 
commonalities, the first round of talks ended on January 31, 2014 
with no progress.270 Brahimi said that during these talks he observed 
some common ground between the parties, which included a 
commitment to discuss implementation of the Geneva Communiqué 
to achieve a political solution and a recognition that to do so they 
                                                                                                                                     
brahimi-a-primer/2014/01/24/c245b376-8531-11e3-bbe5-6a2a3141e3a9_story.html 
(introducing Brahimi’s role as mediator in Syria); Somini Sengupta, Few Eager to Talk Peace 
in Syria, but a Mediator Won’t Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/11/05/world/middleeast/while-few-seem-eager-to-talk-peace-in-syria-un-mediator-wont-
stop.html?_r=0. 
267. Kofi Annan’s Six-Point Plan for Syria, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012327153111767387.html/; Text of Annan’s Six-
Point Peace Plan for Syria, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/04/04/us-syria-ceasefire-idUSBRE8330HJ20120404 (summarizing Annan’s six-
point plan for Syria). 
268. See generally ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria 
Peace Talks Ends, UN NEWS CTR. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=47052#.VNT3m4dzXG4 (introducing the Geneva II Conference and why it 
was important for Syria); Preparations for Upcoming Syria Peace Conference ‘On Track,’ 
Says UN Chief, UN NEWS CTR. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=46812#.VNTt8IdzXG5; What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, BBC 
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442. 
269. See What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, supra note 268 (summarizing the 
goals of the Geneva II Conference and introducing the Geneva Communiqué). 
270. ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria Peace Talks 
Ends, supra note 268; see Anne Barnard & Rick Gladstone, Syria Denounces U.N. Envoy as 
‘Biased’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/middleeast/ 
syria-rebels-raid-air-base-idlib.html (summarizing the result of the first round of talks). 
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must agree on an end to the conflict and establishment of a 
transitional government.271 A second round of talks was scheduled in 
February 2014 and Brahimi explained that this would be a short break 
to allow the parties to prepare their more detailed positions on the 
issues raised and the Geneva Communiqué.272  
The second round of the Geneva II Conference ended without 
progress as well.273 Brahimi said that his proposed agenda for another 
round of talks, which would focus first on ending the violence and 
terrorism and second on creating a transitional government, was 
blocked by President Assad’s representatives.274 He expressed that the 
Syrian government’s stance in this round made the opposition 
suspicious that the government had no intention to discuss a 
transitional government at all and he apologized to the Syrian people 
for the lack of progress.275  
To help facilitate negotiations, Brahimi brought the United 
States, a supporter of the Syrian opposition, and Russia, a supporter of 
the Syrian government, into the talks between the Syrian parties in 
Geneva.276 The United States and Russia taking roles in this 
mediation could have increased pressure on the Syrian parties to come 
to an agreement.277 Although the United States and Russia were 
                                                            
271. ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria Peace Talks 
Ends, supra note 268 (Brahimi’s observation of the mediation). 
272. Id. (describing the circumstances of the second round of talks for the Geneva II 
Conference). 
273. Anne Barnard & Nick Cumming-Bruce, After Second Round of Syria Talks, No 
Agreement Even on How to Negotiate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/16/world/middleeast/after-second-round-of-syria-talks-no-agreement-even-on-how-
to-negotiate.html (introducing the failure of the second round of talks); Daniel Boffey, UN 
Mediator Blames Bashar al-Assad as Syrian Peace Talks Falter, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/16/syria-talks-assad-brahimi-un. 
274. Boffey, supra note 273 (Brahimi blaming Assad for a lack of progress in the second 
round of talks). 
275. Id. (Brahimi expressed his frustrations with one party, Assad, of the mediation). 
276. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“The efforts by the special envoy, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, include a planned meeting in Geneva on Friday with top diplomats from the two 
powers on opposite sides of the Syria conflict: the United States, which supports the 
insurgency, and Russia, which supports the Syrian government but has increasingly displayed 
ambiguity about support for President Bashar al-Assad himself.”); see Ghassan Charbel, 
Brahimi: Geneva I Communique Was ‘Superficial’, AL-MONITOR (June 26, 2014), http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/syria-brahimi-interview-envoy-reasons-
failure.html.  
277. Nick Cumming-Bruce & Hwaida Saad, New Round of Syria Talks Off to a Slow 
Start, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/middleeast/ 
syria.html?ref=lakhdarbrahimi (“Analysts monitoring the talks say the American and Russian 
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making strides to keep the talks alive, the issue remains unresolved 
and the second round of talks in Geneva did not end with an 
agreement between the Syrian parties.278 
This dispiriting finish of the two-week-long rounds of talks 
called into question their future.279 There were strong hopes and 
pressures for a resolution because at the time, this conflict had killed 
more than 135,000 people and displaced 9.5 million from their 
homes.280 Although the talks were sponsored by Russia and the 
United States, which support opposing sides, and were backed by 
dozens of other countries, the added presence and pressure of the 
foreign countries did not result in a discussion of resolution in 
Syria.281 Brahimi said that the talks had broken down because the 
Syrian government rejected his suggestion that the parties discuss 
each side’s top demands rather than spend days discussing the 
government’s priorities.282 This rejection of Brahimi’s suggestion 
                                                                                                                                     
involvement could increase the pressure on both sides to move from shadowboxing to matters 
of substance.”); see Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270.  
278. Brahimi: Syria Peace Talks' Failure Looms, AL JAZEERA (February 14, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/brahimi-syria-peace-talks-failure-looms-
201421318362354985.html (“High-level Russian and US diplomats have promised to help 
keep Syria peace talks alive in Geneva as they reached a deadlock, UN mediator Lakhdar 
Brahimi said. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov and US Under Secretary of 
State Wendy Sherman ‘promised that they will help both here and in their capitals, to unblock 
the situation for us,’ Brahimi told reporters on Thursday, according to the AFP news agency, 
following a meeting with the two diplomats. ‘Until now, we are not making much progress in 
the process,’ Brahimi said, acknowledging that ‘failure is always staring at us in the face… 
The Observatory has reported an average of 236 people killed daily since the so-called Geneva 
2 peace talks began in late January, bringing regime and opposition representatives to the 
negotiating table but producing no concrete results.’”); see Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 
270.  
279. Barnard & Cumming-Bruce, supra note 273 (“The dispiriting finish called into 
question the future of the talks. Two weeklong rounds have produced no actual negotiations on 
resolving a conflict that has killed more than 135,000 people and driven 9.5 million from their 
homes, even though the talks are sponsored by Russia and the United States, which support 
opposing sides, and backed by dozens of other countries. The meetings have instead focused 
on what to discuss and how to do so.”); see Laura Rozen, UN Syria Envoy Brahimi Said to 
Consider Resigning, AL-MONITOR (Mar. 6, 2014), http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/ 
index.php/2014/03/7851/un-syria-envoy-brahimi-said-to-consider-resigning/. 
280. See Barnard & Cumming-Bruce, supra note 273 (acknowledging the pressure riding 
on the talks and a resolution to this conflict). 
281. Id. (highlighting how the presence of the United States, Russia, and other countries 
failed to initiate progress towards a resolution). 
282. Id. (“Mr. Brahimi said the talks had broken down primarily because the Syrian 
government balked at his suggestion that the negotiators discuss both sides’ top demands in the 
first two days of negotiations, rather than spending days on the government’s priorities.”). 
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reflects possible cultural differences and disagreement with mediation 
methods between Brahimi and the parties of this conflict.283  
While Brahimi was working there, the Syrian government 
deemed him “biased” in his efforts to facilitate talks between the 
government and the Syrian opposition.284 The New York Times 
reported that a statement from the Foreign Ministry in Damascus 
denouncing Brahimi appeared to be in response to statements he had 
made suggesting that President Assad must relinquish power and 
waive membership in any replacement government in Syria.285 There 
have been other reports of insults toward Brahimi from a pro-Assad 
newspaper, saying he is “one-eyed and many tongued.”286 Similarly, 
the Syrian opposition party accused Brahimi of overstepping his role 
when he had suggested that Assad’s government should have a role in 
the talks, and complicated his efforts by agreeing to talk peace only if 
Assad set a deadline to step down from office.287 This media 
                                                            
283. See id. (acknowledging how cultural differences between the mediator and the 
parties may have hindered progress in this mediation). 
284. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“Syria’s government appeared to distance 
itself from further engagement with the special peace envoy of the United Nations and the 
Arab League on Thursday, declaring him ‘flagrantly biased’ even as his efforts aimed at a 
political transition to end the nearly two-year-old Syrian conflict were accelerating.”); see 
Syria Calls Joint Envoy Brahimi ‘Biased’, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2013/01/2013110183349199705.html (“Syria has denounced 
international envoy Lakhdar Brahimi as ‘flagrantly biased’ casting doubt on how long the UN-
Arab League mediator can pursue his peace mission”). 
285. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“A statement from the Foreign Ministry in 
Damascus denouncing Mr. Brahimi appeared to be a response to remarks he made to Western 
news agencies the day before in which he suggested that Mr. Assad must relinquish power and 
could not be part of any replacement government in Syria.”); see Syria Calls Joint Envoy 
Brahimi ‘Biased’, supra note 284 (“ The Syrian foreign ministry was responding to remarks by 
Brahimi . . . a day after he ruled out a role for President Bashar al-Asad in a transitional 
government . . . (and) said it was surprised at Brahimi’s comments, which showed ‘he was 
flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring against Syria and its people.’”) 
286. Sengupta, supra note 266; see Charbel, supra note 276 (noting the “hired pens” in 
the Arab region treated Brahimi as an enemy).  
287. Sengupta, supra note 266 (“The Syrian opposition parties accused him of 
overstepping his role when he said last month that Mr. Assad’s government should play a role 
in talks, and then on Sunday they further complicated Mr. Brahimi’s work by insisting that 
they would talk peace only if Mr. Assad set a deadline to step down, according to Reuters.”); 
Charbel, supra note 276 (Quoting Brahimi: “I received [criticism] from both the regime and 
the opposition . . . They (the opposition) had heard from major and important states that the 
conflict was resolved and the departure of Assad was a sure thing. Therefore the opposition 
viewed the call to negotiations as an attempt to help the defeated. In 2013, after making 
advances on the ground, the regime (also) felt that the idea of negotiations was an attempt to 
help the defeated party.”). 
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commentary expresses the Syrian opposition party’s distrust in 
Brahimi and his neutrality in this conflict.288 
On May 13, 2014 Brahimi announced his resignation.289 Brahimi 
explained an incident that signaled that it was time for him to give up: 
“I realized that this process was not going to move forward any time 
soon . . . [n]either Russia nor the US could convince their friends to 
participate in the negotiations with serious intent.”290 UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon expressed regret for Brahimi’s resignation and 
explained that Brahimi “faced almost impossible odds.”291  
Differing cultural perspectives between mediators and the parties 
can lead to confusion about the methods the mediator employs and 
how both the parties and public perceive him.292 The divide between 
individualist and collectivist cultures can make determining whether 
the tactics and methods used by cross-cultural mediators are ethical 
very difficult and often results in misunderstandings.293 This 
ambiguity and misperception was present in Mitchell’s mediation in 
Israel-Palestine and Brahimi’s mediation in Syria.294 Part III further 
explores Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences and explains how 
cultural differences and ethical ambiguity affected the outcomes of 
their mediations.  
                                                            
288.  See supra note 287 and accompanying text (reflecting on negative commentary of 
Brahimi). 
289.  Ian Black, UN Syria Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi Resigns After Failure of Geneva 
Talks, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/un-syria-
envoy-lakhdar-brahimi-resigns (“Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy for Syria, finally announced 
his resignation on Tuesday, expressing regret for his inability to forge a coherent international 
response to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”); Susanne Koelbl, Interview with UN Peace 
Envoy Brahimi: ‘Syria Will Become Another Somalia’, SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 7, 2014), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-un-peace-envoy-to-syria-lakhdar-
brahimi-a-974036.html. 
290.  Koelbl, supra note 289 (Brahimi acknowledging the stalemate between the parties). 
291. Syria: UN-Arab Envoy Brahimi Resigns, UN NEWS CTR. (May 13, 2014), http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47780#.VCxd4CjEfap (“In his remarks, Mr. Ban 
said that for nearly two years, Mr. Brahimi had sought an end to the brutal and still worsening 
civil war in Syria. Indeed, the 80-year old Algerian diplomat has faced almost impossible 
odds, ‘with a Syrian nation, Middle Easters region and wider international community that 
have been hopelessly divided in their approaches to ending the conflict.’”).  
292. See supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (referring back to theory about 
mediator preferences based on culture). 
293. See supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text (explaining the divide between 
individualists and collectivists on mediation methods). 
294. See supra notes 259-65, 283 and accompanying text (connecting Mitchell and 
Brahimi’s mediations to individualist and collectivist theory). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF MITCHELL AND BRAHIMI’S MEDIATIONS 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-
CULTURAL MEDIATORS 
Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences, considered in tandem with 
existing theories on mediator neutrality and ethics, provide a basis for 
generating suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural 
mediations. Part III.A provides analysis of Mitchell’s experiences and 
explores why Mitchell achieved a successful agreement in Ireland and 
frustration and ridicule in Israel-Palestine. Part III.B examines 
Brahimi’s experience in Syria and explores possible flaws in his 
perception of neutrality and possible explanations for why he was 
viewed as biased.  
Taking the lessons learned from the Mitchell and Brahimi 
experiences, Part III.C provides suggestions for mediators on how to 
be neutral and gain legitimate trust when mediating cross-culturally. 
This Section analyzes Mitchell and Brahimi’s real life trials and 
failures to gain trust and a perception of neutrality in their mediations. 
Subsequently, this Section suggests that a mediator develop an 
understand of his own culture and the mediating parties’ cultures, 
enhance mutual understanding between him and the mediating 
parties, draw from lessons learned by other mediators in failed 
mediations, and proposes that standards for mediators incorporate the 
role culture plays in the ethical expectations of a mediator.  
A. Why George Mitchell Experienced Success and Praise in Ireland 
and Frustration and Failure in Israel-Palestine 
This Section examines how the people of Northern Ireland 
viewed Mitchell with praise and acceptance when mediating in 
Ireland, which resulted in a resolution, and how contrastingly 
Mitchell was met with skepticism and distrust in Israel-Palestine 
leading to his withdrawal. Mitchell’s American nationality and 
culture likely played a role in the international public’s perception of 
his neutrality and in the methods by which he conducted these 
mediations. The opposite outcomes reached by Mitchell in Northern 
Ireland and Israel can be attributed to a variety of factors including 
how the local populations viewed his role as mediator and how 
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participants viewed his own nationality as influencing his neutrality 
and mediation methods.295 
In Ireland, some of the negative views of Mitchell explained 
previously were brought on because of his US nationality and Irish 
and Northern Irish views of whom the United States was supporting 
in this mediation.296 Mitchell has addressed this bias saying to the 
delegates:  
 
I don’t bring with me an American plan.297 There is no 
Clinton plan; there is no Mitchell plan.298 Any agreement 
will be yours.299 Two years later when I drafted what 
became the Good Friday Agreement I made sure every word 
in it had come from them.”300  
 
Mitchell made an effort to make the parties confident that the 
agreement was based on their wants and needs and not on a US 
agenda, and this attitude may have contributed to the Irish and 
Northern Irish cooperation with Mitchell.301 This method is reflected 
in the US Model Standards requirement for self determination, which 
requires that a mediator not undermine a party’s ability to come to a 
voluntary and uncoerced decision where each party makes free and 
informed choices.302 This method also exemplifies Mitchell’s efforts 
to remain neutral and not let his nationality give the mediating parties 
                                                            
295. See supra Part II.C.i (describing how Mitchell’s nationality may have affected his 
success and progress in his mediations in Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine). 
296. McKittrick, supra note 188 (“Once American and above all Irish-American 
involvement was viewed as pestilential meddling, with the US seen as a source of IRA guns 
and money. The State Department and the White House were generally Anglophile, but the 
Senate and Congress were seen as pro-Irish nationalist and sometimes republican.”); Corry, 
supra note 201.  
297. Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Accord, 10 Years On, NPR (Apr. 6, 2008), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89418366. 
298. Id. (Mitchell detaching himself and President Clinton from the mediation tactics 
used in Northern Ireland). 
299. Id. (Mitchell directing his plans toward the people of Northern Ireland). 
300. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his and the US’ lack of influence on the people of 
Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement). 
301. See supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text (describing how Mitchell’s lack of 
ownership and US detachment from the mediation agreement may have led to success in 
Northern Ireland). 
302.  See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (connecting Mitchell’s mediation 
methods to the US Model Standards); see also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating Mitchell’s efforts to make the Northern Ireland process inclusive). 
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the impression that he was impartial in this peace process.303 
Ultimately, Irish and Northern Irish skepticism of Mitchell and the 
United States quickly reversed and he and President Clinton were 
increasingly embraced in the region.304 Mitchell’s work in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland is an example of a mediator overcoming bias in a 
foreign country and gaining their trust and cooperation in coming to a 
resolution.305  
The acceptance and praise Mitchell received for this mediation 
could be attributed, in part, to the fact that the United States, Ireland, 
and Northern Ireland all have individualistic cultures and had an 
easier time agreeing on negotiation and mediation tactics. When 
speaking of the Northern Ireland conflict, Mitchell said, “I formed the 
conviction that there is no such thing as a conflict that can’t be ended. 
Conflicts are created, conducted and sustained by human beings. 
They can be ended by human beings.”306 This quote reflects an 
individualist notion that conflict is natural with the assumption that 
people welcome resolution, which is not the view of a collectivist 
who sees shame in conflict.307 
Alternatively, Palestine’s rejection of Mitchell’s method of 
mediation reflects collectivist tendencies to avoid acknowledgement 
of conflict because of the shame associated with it.308 Chairman 
Abbas’ unwillingness to come to the table also reflects a lack of trust 
in the United States and of the US mediator, Mitchell.309 Collectivists 
                                                            
303. See supra note 301. See generally supra notes 17-18 (emphasizing the role of 
neutrality in mediation).  
304. See supra notes 197-200 (explaining how Northern Ireland embraced Mitchell). 
305. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (Mitchell exemplifying how a 
mediator overcame bias in a foreign country). 
306.  US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, supra note 253.  
307. See Wright, supra note 144; Elahee et al., supra note 144, at 805 (describing how 
Mitchell’s individualist ideas are not congruent with collectivists). 
308. See Wright, supra note 144 (“For collectivists . . . even a tacit acknowledgement of 
conflict could cause a loss of face, and participation in a typical mediation in the United States 
might be an unwelcome experience. Collectivists might refuse to participate in voluntary 
mediation, and if mandatory, might resist orders to mediate. If mediation is unavoidable, they 
might exhibit signs of anxiety and confusion during the process. Collectivists’ resistance to 
mediation, as it is practiced in the United States, is likely to be most pronounced when the 
other disputants are current or former ingroup members or persons with whom the collectivists 
wish to maintain or re-establish relationships. Resistance to mediation is likely to be less 
intense when the other disputants are outgroup members or former ingroup members with 
whom the collectivists no longer wish to maintain relationships.”). See generally Menkel-
Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4.  
309. See The Palestinians and the Peace Process, supra note 239 (“They are airing a 
plan promoted by the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, to get on with building a state 
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are less concerned with the credentials of the mediator and more 
concerned with his familiarity with and relationship to the parties.310 
In this respect, collectivists perceive neutrality differently from 
individualists and consider familiarity and their relationship with the 
mediator more indicative of his neutrality in a mediation than his 
credentials and professional background.311 
The Palestinians’ fear of “losing face” and skepticism of the 
United States could be reasons why they were unwilling to 
negotiate.312 Daniel Levy, a veteran Israeli peace negotiator who is 
now at the New America Foundation, comments on the need for 
change in American negotiation methods between Israel and 
Palestine: “If they ([US] mediators and the Whitehouse) are not 
willing to pay the political cost of trying to resolve it – which means 
not always being Israel’s lawyer – then maybe they need to let others 
in to play a greater role.”313 Levy expresses a perception that the 
United States has motives to help and support Israel, which make the 
Palestinians distrustful of a US intervention in this conflict.314 
Perceptions of US biases in favor of Israel may have stymied 
                                                                                                                                     
that can then be presented for recognition by the UN Security Council in a couple of years. But 
few Palestinians would risk relying on the Security Council, where the Americans have a veto, 
to vote for such a state. Should the Americans and Europeans then balk, Mr[.] Fayyad would 
look as silly as Mr[.] Abbas.”); Parrish, Christine, Sen. George Mitchell on Mid-East Peace 
Process, FREE PRESS ONLINE (Nov. 17, 2011) (“Americans have an economic and ideological 
stake in the Israelis and Palestinians achieving a lasting peace, said Mitchell. ‘We have a 
strong commitment to be involved in the region, in part out of self-interest,’ he said. ‘The 
known reserves of oil and natural gas are there and they are essential to our economy. Conflict 
could cause major disruption with devastating effects on our economy and on other economies. 
It is in our interest to maintain a degree of stability.’ ‘Second, we believe in democratic ideals, 
the right to self-governance and to promote that,’ said Mitchell.”). 
310. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (collectivists concerns for comfort and 
familiarity in a mediator). 
311. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (referring to the different expectations of 
individualists and collectivists).  
312. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (for collectivists an acknowledgment of 
conflict can be seen as a loss of face and result in collectivist parties’ reluctance to participate 
in mediation); supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text (after Obama’s administration 
persuaded Abbas to agree to demand a complete settlement freeze as a price for restarting talks 
and that freeze did not happen Palestinians began to get frustrated and embarrassed); supra 
notes 246-48 and accompanying text (These political constraints made the talks between 
Abbas and Netanyahu in Washington in September of 2010 very difficult and after these talks 
failed Mitchell spent the rest of 2010 trying to get these parties back in the same room). 
313. See Stone, supra note 236; Do Get a Move On, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 28, 
2010), http//indianexpress.com/articles/news-archive/web/do-get-a-move-on/ (commenting on 
how the US may have a bias toward Israel and that they should possibly resolve that bias by 
changing their methods). 
314. See id. (acknowledging Palestinian distrust of the United States). 
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mediation talks led by Mitchell between Israel and Palestine.315 
Mitchell embodied the US characteristic of having a hard deadline set 
for an outcome in the Israel-Palestine mediation.316 When his 
expectations were not met, and he had reached his two-year deadline, 
he resigned from this job.317 
B. How Lakhdar Brahimi’s Perceived Bias Against the Syrian 
Government and Cultural Complications May Have Compromised a 
Resolution for his Mediation in Syria 
The Syrian government characterized Brahimi as biased after he 
made suggestions that Assad relinquish power and not be a part of a 
replacement government in Syria.318 Barnard explained that Brahimi 
could be “sidelined into irrelevance” by Syrian criticism like his 
predecessor, Annan, by the antagonists in the conflict who show little 
interest in engaging in mediations.319 The Syrian government, in 
response to his comments about Assad, said that Brahimi “is 
flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring against Syria and its 
people,” suggesting a loss of faith in him.320  
                                                            
315. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (hypothesizing about causes for 
Palestinian distrust). 
316. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying notes (referring back to cultural theory). 
317. See Myers, supra note 233 (“In the letter, Mr. Mitchell, 77, said he had initially 
agreed to do what the president called “the toughest job imaginable” for only two years. He 
largely abandoned his diplomatic efforts after a failed push last year to persuade Israel to 
freeze the construction of settlements in territories claimed by the Palestinians.”); Barak Ravid, 
Palestinians Made Your Peace Efforts Difficult, Netanyahu Tells Mitchell, HAARETZ (May 14, 
2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinians-made-your-peace-efforts
-difficult-netanyahu-tells-mitchell-1.361682 (“Mitchell is leaving as peace talks between Israel 
and the Palestinians have come to a standstill, though he did not mention the matter in his 
resignation. He said that when he took on the role his intention was to serve for two years and 
more than that has now passed.”).  
318. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (referring to commentary on 
Brahimi). 
319. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“The Syrian criticism of Mr. Brahimi, a 
veteran Algerian statesman who spent days talking with Mr. Assad and other Syrian officials 
in Damascus last month, raised the possibility that he, like his predecessor, Kofi Annan, could 
be sidelined into irrelevance by the antagonists in the conflict, who have shown little or no 
interest in dialogue as the violence has worsened. At least 60,000 people have been killed in 
Syria since the uprising against Mr. Assad began in March 2011, the United Nations said last 
week. Mr. Brahimi told the BBC on Wednesday that Syrians want the Assad family to go after 
four decades in power. He told Reuters that he saw no place for Mr. Assad in any political 
transition.”). 
320. Id. (“Syria’s Foreign Ministry said Thursday in a statement that such remarks were 
a surprise and showed that Mr. Brahimi “is flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring 
against Syria and its people.” The ministry statement suggested that Syria’s government had 
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The Syrian government has a valid point in calling Brahimi 
biased, considering that the UN Guidance suggests that mediators 
address the issue of impartiality by treating the parties in a fair and 
balanced way and minimizing public criticism of the parties as much 
as possible.321 A mediator’s role is to help the parties reach their own 
agreement.322 Publicly expressing that Assad should not be in office 
could call into question Brahimi’s impartiality and neutrality in the 
matter.323 Brahimi’s difficulties in forming an agreement between the 
Syrian government and opposition could have stemmed from this 
Syrian government distrust in his neutrality.324  
Brahimi’s mediation could have also been stymied because the 
Russian, US, Syrian, Arab, and UN parties taking part in the 
negotiation, coming from many different cultures, were having a hard 
time reaching an outcome with which they all agreed.325 The United 
States, an individualist culture, partnered with the Syrian opposition, 
were able to acknowledge conflict and participate in the mediation 
without feeling ashamed.326 Contrastingly Russia, a collectivist 
culture partnered with the Syrian government, seemed to consider 
acknowledgement of conflict as a “loss of face” and this shame 
stymied their participation in the Geneva II Conference.327  
Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences and failures in Israel-
Palestine and Syria are good examples to draw from when making 
suggestions to and creating guidelines for cross-cultural mediators. 
The following Section provides suggestions for the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                     
lost whatever faith it might have reserved for Mr. Brahimi. Still, it did not specifically declare 
unwillingness to work with him.”). 
321. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (referring to UN Guidance on 
impartiality). 
322. See supra note 5 (referencing the role of a mediator). 
323. See supra note 285 (illustrating Brahimi’s perceived biases affecting negotiating 
progress in Syria). 
324. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (acknowledging how lack of trust 
has affected mediation efforts in Syria). 
325. See Sengupta, supra note 266 (“Those fighting on the battlefield do not seem eager 
to talk peace, nor do the powerful countries that support them. Scholars of the region say 
neither the United States nor Russia, nor the regional powers with a direct stake in Syria, can 
agree on what an acceptable outcome would be — let alone how to get there.”). See generally 
notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of culture on negotiations).  
326. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing the individualist 
participant’s tendencies); supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (showing complications 
arising from negotiating efforts in Syria).  
327. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing collectivist tendencies); 
supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (showing complications arising from negotiating 
efforts in Syria).  
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cultural factors and methods in guidelines for mediators, such as the 
ones previously discussed in Part I.B. It also acknowledges that 
drawing from the experiences of mediators like Mitchell and Brahimi 
would be useful to help cross-cultural mediators deal with dilemmas 
involving differing ethical expectations of mediators depending on 
culture and nationality and how these expectations can affect the way 
a cross-cultural mediator is perceived.  
C. Recommendations for Mediators Dealing with Cultural 
Differences and Issues of Neutrality 
When approaching a cross-cultural mediation, a mediator can 
make efforts to avoid Mitchell and Brahimi’s shortcomings and gain 
trust and mutual understanding among the mediating parties in order 
to cause a positive outcome.328 Initially the mediator should develop 
an understanding of his own culture and the mediating parties’ 
cultures.329 Next, the mediator should enhance mutual understanding 
between him and the mediating parties by discussing their 
expectations of the mediation and the mediator.330 The mediator 
should additionally draw from lessons learned by other mediators in 
failed mediation experiences.331 Lastly, the mediation guidelines and 
institutions should acknowledge the role culture plays in the ethical 
expectations of a cross-cultural mediator and incorporate this into 
mediation standards.332 
In order for a mediator to gain success and resolutions in cross-
cultural mediations it is pivotal for that mediator to develop an 
understanding of the parties’ cultures, understand how his own culture 
influences his methods and tendencies, bridge the cultural gap 
between himself and the mediating parties, and evaluate whether he is 
the right mediator for the conflict at hand.333 Mediators should also 
acknowledge not only their own individualist and collectivist cultural 
                                                            
328. See infra notes 333-37 and accompanying text (explaining how a mediator can gain 
trust and understanding among the mediating parties). 
329. See infra note 333 and accompanying text (commenting on mutual understanding). 
330. See infra notes 335-42 and accompanying text (suggestions on how to enhance 
mutual understanding). 
331. See infra notes 343-50 and accompanying text (drawing examples from Mitchell 
and Brahimi’s mediations). 
332. See infra notes 351-59 and accompanying text (suggestions for including cultural 
standards to mediator guidelines). 
333. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (recalling cross-cultural mediation 
suggestions). 
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behaviors, but also those of the mediating parties, and make an effort 
to understand this behavior and come to a common ground with 
regards to preferences of mediation methods.334  
After the mediator individually develops an understanding of his 
own and his mediating parties’ cultures and expectations, he should 
make efforts to enhance mutual understanding between himself and 
the mediating parties.335 In order to avoid conflicting cultural 
expectations, the mediator should discuss his ideas of what are proper 
mediation roles and methods, have the mediating parties do the same, 
and come to an agreement on what roles and methods would be 
proper for the mediation at hand.336 When coming to an agreement on 
what would be the proper roles and methods to use in the mediation, 
mediators can also refer to the numerous guidelines established for 
mediations discussed previously, and choose one of these guidelines 
to govern their mediation.337  
For example, if a mediator decided to use the UN Guidance to 
govern his mediation, he and the mediating parties would benefit 
from numerous suggestions and requirements stipulated in these 
guidelines.338 The UN Guidance identifies key fundamentals that 
should be considered in a mediation effort such as consent, 
impartiality, and quality peace agreements, providing the mediator 
with a checklist of things to consider when contemplating and 
executing a mediation.339 Suggestions for how to address impartiality 
are also included in these guidelines, which is a great rubric for 
mediators to deal with such an ambiguous but crucial issue in 
mediations.340 The UN Guidance also has inclusivity and national 
ownership sections that explain who should be involved in the 
                                                            
334. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (suggesting a mediator gain 
additional cultural understanding). 
335. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text (introducing the suggestion of 
enhancing mutual understanding).  
336. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of 
communication between the mediator and the mediating parties). 
337. See supra Part I.B (recalling the previously discussed standard’s for mediators). 
338. See supra Part I.B.iii.a (exemplifying how to use the UN Guidance as a framework 
to govern a mediation).  
339. See UN Guidance, supra note 83, at 3 (“To address these issues, the Guidance 
identifies a number of key fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort: 
preparedness; consent; impartiality; inclusivity; national ownership; international law and 
normative frameworks; coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; 
and quality peace agreements.”).  
340. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
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mediation, which would be useful for the mediator to ensure that an 
excluded party does not compromise the mediation.341 Such a 
framework can eliminate some of the guesswork and confusion that 
can arise for a mediator in a cross-cultural mediation.342 
Additionally, the mediator should draw on the lessons learned 
from failed mediation experiences.343 Examining the experiences and 
failures of other cross-cultural mediators and identifying their 
mistakes is also a useful way for a mediator to determine what 
behavior is appropriate for mediating parties from certain cultural and 
political backgrounds.344 Mitchell seemed to have misstepped in 
Israel-Palestine by setting a deadline, lacking an understanding of the 
conflict and culture there, being from a country with an obvious 
interest in the conflict, and not realizing that a conflict involving a 
collectivist party would most likely not accept individualist methods 
that he deemed successful in his past mediation in Northern Ireland.345 
Brahimi seemed to have gone wrong in Syria also by setting 
deadlines, using individualist mediation methods with which he was 
culturally comfortable but that the collectivist Syrian government 
rejected, and publicly making suggestions about Assad’s current and 
future role that gave the impression of bias.346  
A common mistake made by Mitchell and Brahimi was using 
methods that they were culturally comfortable with without 
considering that the parties were not accustomed to these methods.347 
To avoid this mistake it would benefit a mediator to reference Hal 
Abramson’s four-step approach to cross-cultural mediation.348 
Following this framework, a mediator can bridge the cultural divide 
by educating the parties about their own cultures and the mediator’s 
culture and discussing what their preferences are.349 The mediator 
should also consider the ethical problems that may arise during cross-
                                                            
341. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.  
342. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (summarizing the UN Guidance).  
343. See infra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (introducing suggestions for 
examining failed mediations). 
344. See supra Part III.A-B (highlighting the need for mediators to consider culture and 
politics in crafting their mediations, in light of past failures in Israel-Palestine and Syria). 
345. See supra Parts II.C, III.A (recalling Mitchell’s mistakes when mediating in Israel-
Palestine). 
346. See supra Parts II.C.ii, III.B (recalling Brahimi’s mistakes when mediating in 
Syria). 
347. See supra Parts II.C.i.b.-ii.  
348. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.  
349. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
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cultural mediations and make sure they are on ethical common ground 
with their parties to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
mediation.350  
Lastly, mediation guidelines and institutions should 
acknowledge the role of culture in the ethical expectations for 
mediators.351 Mediation guidelines must acknowledge the role culture 
plays in the ethical expectations of cross-cultural mediators and 
include standards for this in these guidelines.352 Building upon 
existing guidelines with examples and explanations of cultural 
dilemmas and stalemates that a mediator may encounter and 
providing guidance for how to deal with these problems would greatly 
benefit the cross-cultural mediator.353  
For example, these guidelines could include some of the 
individualist and collectivist studies and statistics previously 
discussed, such as Abramson’s four step approach and the previously 
discussed Ethically Ambiguous Negotiation Tactics, to help a cross-
cultural mediator identify the kind of culture and expectations he may 
be dealing with in a certain country.354 This would help him execute a 
plan to understand that culture and what will be expected of him.355 
This would also help him evaluate whether he would be the right 
mediator for a certain conflict based on his mediation methods and 
background.356 Making this evaluation would also allow the mediator 
to determine whether he would be able to overcome the cultural 
biases and judgment he may face due to his nationality and culture.357 
It would also help him evaluate whether the mediating parties will 
question his neutrality, which is an important legitimizing ethical 
factor in mediation, and whether this distrust between him and the 
                                                            
350. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.  
351. See supra notes 347-350 and accompanying text; see infra notes 352-54 and 
accompanying text (introducing cultural suggestions for cross-cultural mediation).  
352. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (recalling cultural theory for cross-
cultural mediation). 
353. See supra Part II.A-B (suggesting cross-cultural mediators familiarize themselves 
with cultural theory). 
354. See supra Parts II.A-B (referencing individualist and collectivist studies and 
statistics). 
355. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (commenting on cultural 
understanding). 
356. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (referencing knowing when to 
withdraw from a mediation previously discussed). 
357. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of 
mediator’s acknowledging culture). 
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parties would create barriers to resolution that most likely will not be 
overcome.358 Increased incorporation of cultural issues into standards 
for cross-cultural mediators could be very beneficial for cross-cultural 
mediations and possibly lead to more resolutions.359 
CONCLUSION 
Culture and nationality are important factors in cross-cultural 
mediations and should be neither neglected nor ignored.360 If cross-
cultural mediators had tools to better navigate these cultural 
differences between themselves and the mediating parties, this would 
open up the possibility of more successful cross-cultural mediations 
and the creation of resolutions that would affect many countries and 
groups of people in a positive way.361 Acknowledging these factors 
and drawing upon the experiences and failures of cross-cultural 
mediators would bring great improvements to the practice of cross-
cultural mediation.362 
 
 
                                                            
358. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (incorporating neutrality into the 
discussion of culture). 
359. See supra notes 346-53 and accompanying text.  
360. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text. 
361. See Part III.C (emphasizing the importance of addressing culture). 
362. See Part III.C (concluding that better acknowledgement of cultural and ethical 
expectations of mediators would benefit the profession). 
